Belief

Traditionally knowledge is distinct form belief, as knowledge is objective, and only justified, true, beliefs comprise knowledge

However, from a constructivist perspective, there is no absolute objective external basis for judging someone else’s beliefs.

In everyday life, and indeed in education, the philosophical notion of knowledge as true reasoned belief is seldom pertinent, nor what we mean when we refer to knowledge:

“Much of our knowledge pretends to nothing more than probability. We guess, have hunches, and believe on such evidence as is available, and for the time being we take what we believe to be true without, however, claiming certainty for our beliefs. If we are wise we go on testing our beliefs, searching for further evidence that will confirm or refute them. A great deal of our knowledge clearly is of this kind and it has been held that all of it is so.” (Aaron, 1971, p. 49, emphasis added)

Aaron, R. I. (1971). Knowing and the Function of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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