Cause and effect?: People go to different places because of what they are wearing
Keith S. Taber
Annie was a participant in the Understanding Chemical Bonding project. She was a second year 'A level' student (c.18 years of age) when she was talking to me about atoms and electrons, but I was struck with the way she used the word 'because'.
Technically this conjunction is linked with causality, something of importance in science. To say that X occurred because of Y is to claim that Y was a cause of X.
I wanted to clarify if Annie's use of 'because' in that chemical context actually implied that she was describing what she considered a cause, or whether she was using the word more loosely. To probe this I presented what I considered an obviously inappropriate use of 'because': that football fans following different teams in the same city would go to different matches BECAUSE of the colour of the clothes they wore (i.e., hats and scarves traditionally worn to show support to a particular team).
Because the sky is blue, it makes me cry
I expected Annie to point out that this was not the reason, and so 'because' should not be used – which would have then allowed me to return to her earlier use of 'because' in the context of atoms. However, Annie seemed quite happy with my supposedly 'straw-man' or 'Aunt Sally' example:
So we're talking about what you might call cause and effect, that something is caused by something else. We do a lot of talking about cause and effect in science – "this causes that to happen."
If you think about people in Liverpool, only because this is the first analogy that comes to mind, if you actually go to Liverpool on Saturday [*] and wander round, you'll probably find quite a few people wandering around wearing red, and quite a few people wandering around wearing blue, and sometime after lunch you'll find that all the people wearing red, a lot of the people wearing red, tend to move off to one particular place.[**] And the people wearing blue tend to move to a different sort of place, as though they are repelled, you know, similar colours attracted together.
Uh hm.
Agreed?
Yes.
And we could say therefore, that the reason that some people go towards the Liverpool ground, is because they're wearing red, and the reason some people go towards the Everton ground, is because they're wearing blue. Now would that be a fair description?
Yeah.
And do you agree with the sense of cause and effect there – that people go to watch Liverpool because they're wearing red hats and red scarves? And people go to look at Everton because they're wearing blue hats and blue scarves?
Yes.
So would you say the cause of which football team you go to see, the cause of that, is what clothes you happen to be wearing?
(Pause, c.4s)
Unless you're a rambler. {Laughs}…
No, no, well yes, if you're wearing, you're obviously supporting that colour, so, that team, so so you'd assume, that they were going to watch, the team they favoured.
Right, okay, erm, I'll think of a different example, I think.
Because the world is round, it turns me on
Annie did not seem to 'get' what I had thought would be an obvious flaw in the argument. Fans wear the colours of their team to show support and affiliation; and go to the place where their team is playing: but they do not go to the particular stadium because they happen to be wearing red or blue.
This is linked to the difference between causation and correlation. Often two correlated variables do not have a direct causal relationship, but have a relationship mediated by some other factor.
Height of children in a primary school will be correlated with their grade number (on average, the children in the first year are shorter than those in the second year, who are shorter than…). But children are not organised into grades according to height, and height is not caused by grade. Both are independently related to the child's age.
Colour of football scarves is correlated with destination on match day, but one does not cause the other – rather both colour choice and destination are actually due to something else: affiliation to a club. [***]
I switched to a another example I hoped would be familiar, based on a swimming pool. I though the idea that changing rooms are (usually) designated by gender would make it obvious that where people went to change on leaving the pool correlated to, but was not because of, what they were wearing. Again, however, Annie did not seem to consider it inappropriate to describe this in terms of the the different types of swimming costume causing the behaviour.
If you go to the swimming pool, and watch people swimming, you'll find out that some people when they're swimming at a swimming pool, tend to wear a swimming costume that only covers, the hips basically, and other people either a swimming costume that covers most of the trunk, or two separate parts to it. And if you observe them very closely, which is always a bit suspicious at a swimming pool, you'll notice that when they get out of the pool, they're attracted towards different rooms, these changing rooms…
But all the people who just have the one part of the costume, are attracted towards one room, and the others are attracted towards the other room, the ones with sort of either very long costumes or two part costumes. So is it fair to say that it's caused by what clothes they are wearing, that determines which room they go and get changed in?
Yes.
It is?
(Pause, c.4s)
Yes.
That's the cause of it?
(Pause, c5s)
Yeah. It's also conventional as well.
So in both cases Annie was happy to talk in terms of the clothing causing behaviour. After some further discussion Annie seemed to appreciate the distinction I was making, but even if she did not have a flawed notion of causality, it certainly appeared she have developed non-canonical ways of talking about cause and effect.
Because the wind is high, it blows my mind
Annie was a clever person, and I am sure that the issue here was primarily about use of language rather than an inability to understand causation. However, even if our thinking is not entirely verbal, the major role of verbal language in human thought means that when one does not have the language, one may not have the related explicit concepts.
It is very easy to assume that students, especially those we recognise as capable and having been academically successful, share common 'non-technical' language – but there is plenty of research that suggests that many students do not have a clear appreciation of how such terms are canonically used. These are terms we might think people generally would know, such as adjacent, efficient, maximum, initial, omit, abundant, proportion… (Johnstone & Selepeng, 2001). As always, a useful guide to the teacher is 'never assume'.
* At the time of the interview, it was general practice for most English football league matches to be played at 15.00 on a Saturday.
** One constraint on the scheduling of football matches is that, as far as possible, two local rival ('paired') teams should not play home matches on the same day, to avoid potential clashes between large crowds of rival fans. However, such 'paired clashes', as they are technically called (Kendall et al., 2013), are not always avoided.
*** Of course, this is not a direct cause. A person could support one team, yet choose to wear the colours of another for some reason, but their support for a team usually motivates the choice. Social patterns are messier than natural laws.
Sources cited:
- Johnstone, A. H., & Selepeng, D. (2001). A language problem revisited. Chemistry Education: Research & Practice in Europe, 2(1), 19-29.
- Kendall G., McCollum B., Cruz F.R.B., McMullan P., While L. (2013) Scheduling English Football Fixtures: Consideration of Two Conflicting Objectives. In: Talbi EG. (eds) Hybrid Metaheuristics. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 434. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30671-6_14
