Constructivism as a Research Programme

Constructivism in Science Education as a Scientific Research Programme

I have a argued that constructivism in science education, that is, research into learners' conceptions of scientific topics and work on the teaching and learning science informed by constructivism can be considered as a scientific research programme, and indeed a progressive research programme (Taber, 2006, 2009).

Scientific Research Programmes

The idea of a scientific research programme derives from the work of the philosopher of science and maths, Imre Lakatos (1970), and can be considered as "a particular way of thinking about research undertaken within a field that has a continuity and coherence, and which provides a basis for deciding whether a research tradition is scientific or not" (Taber, 2009: 1).

The notion of a research programme has some elements in common with the Kuhnian notion of communities of scholars working within a common disciplinary matrix and sharing a paradigm (or paradigms, when the term is limited to its meaning as specific exemplars). However, for Lakatos it was possible for several parallel research programmes to coexist in a field over extended periods without the need to see one as being dominant ('normal science' in Kuhn's sense) as each RP might be seen as a rational enterprise in its own as long as long as it remained progressive.

Progressive research programmes

Science can be seen as having a dialectic aspect. Observations are interpreted within, and motivate the development of theories, and indeed the testing of those theories by indicating further observations. Theory and experiment do not have a one-way relationship, but, rather, there is a cycling back and forth between the two. In an effective science, new theory does not simply explain what has already been observed, but allows successful predictions of new observations in novel conditions.

Some programmes of research in certain areas of scholarship are arguably not scientific as their theories can (it is claimed) be made to cover any outcomes – they are more like ideology than science, and do not make bold predictions that that be used to really test the theory. (So, such arguments have been made about Marxism and Freudian psychotherapy.)

A programme is progressive as long as theory is predictive and not just retrospectively explaining what has already been observed, and the predictions are having some success under testing. Theory is guiding new empirical work, and new findings are allowing the theoretical apparatus to be expanded or refined.

Features of a research programme

Lakatos argued that research programmes (PR) had a 'hard core' of commitments that are not questioned in that programme around which is developed a 'protective belt' of further theory which is modified as the programme develops. As well as a 'negative heuristic' (that one does not test or seek to undermine the hard core) the programme has a 'positive heuristic' setting out the direction for future work to develop the programme.

My argument was that there was an extensive body of research in science education which could be considered to be a research programme where it was possible to identify the elements Lakatos suggested a RP would have. Characterising the RP in that way also helped address some of the most common criticisms of constructivism in science education, as well as highlighting directions for further research.

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