A Model of Science

A Model of Science: Lakatos and Scientific Research Programmes

One of Keith's publications is

The previous chapter is ‘Scientific’ Research in Education

Chapter 3 is A Model of Science: Lakatos and Scientific Research Programmes

Contents:

• 3.1  Lakatos: An Alternative to Popper and Kuhn
• 3.2  Paradigms As a Unit of Analysis in Science
• 3.2.1  Revolutionary Science and Normal Science
• 3.2.2  The Notion of a Paradigm
• 3.2.3  Normal Science
• 3.2.4  The Disciplinary Matrix
• 3.2.5  Scientific Revolutions
• 3.2.6  Gestalt-Shifts and Paradigm-Shifts
• 3.2.7  Incommensurability of Paradigms
• 3.3  Criticisms of Kuhn’s Model
• 3.3.1  Relativism and Subjectivity
• 3.3.2  The Myth of the Framework
• 3.3.3  Qualified Relativism
• 3.3.4  Progress and Non-Revolutions
• 3.4  Parallels Between Science and Science Education?
• 3.5  Lakatos and RP As Units of Analysis
• 3.6  The Key Features of a SRP
• 3.6.1  The Hard Core and the Negative Heuristic
• 3.6.2  The Protective Belt
• 3.6.3  The Positive Heuristic of a RP
• 3.6.4  Models As Part of the Protective Belt
• 3.7  Refutation in RP
• 3.7.1 Quarantine of Anomalies
• 3.8  Evaluating RP
• 3.8.1  Progressive RP
• 3.8.2  Degenerate RP
• 3.8.3  Competition Between RP
• 3.9  Relating Paradigms, Programmes and Frameworks
• 3.10  Scientific RP and the Social Sciences
• 3.10.1  The Significance of Demarcation
• 3.10.2  Normative Knowledge and RP
• 3.10.3  Progressive and Scientific RP
• 3.10.4  RP in Science and Pseudoscience
• 3.11  The Origins of a RP
• 3.11.1 Nursing RP
• 3.12  Summary

Summary

"This chapter has considered how Lakatos responded to perceived weaknesses in both Popper’s prescription of Science, and Kuhn’s model of paradigms, by offering a view of Science that was able to accommodate the logical impossibility of proof or refutation of individual theories, without the need to see judgements of scientific progress as only possible from within entrenched positions.

The model (or Lakatos would say methodology) of SRP [scientific research programmes] allows Science to be judged at a larger grain size than individual cases of conjectures and refutations, and – like Kuhn’s approach – allows counter-evidence to be interpreted within a particular conceptual framework: something that clearly happens in science and is essential to stop the whole business grinding to a halt. However, adjustments to theory within a SRP have to make sense from the logic of the programme and offer new predictions that are testable, rather than just include ad hoc additions to fit the existing data. A RP that behaves in such a theoretically progressive manner can be considered as scientific, rather than a pseudoscience.

Theoretically progressive RP, i.e. SRP, that do not seem to immediately lead to empirical corroboration should be humoured, especially when new, as it may take considerable time for the programme to develop models that are sophisticated enough to become empirically progressive (corroborated). However, even if a RP is theoretically progressive, it cannot continue indefinitely quarantining inconvenient empirical evidence without challenge. Eventually a competing RP will offer an approach that is better able to make progress, and will seem to offer a more fertile home for most researchers.

In Chapter 2 [‘Scientific’ Research in Education] it was suggested that educational research (or at least, some educational research) could fit into a post-positivist view of Science. The present chapter has detailed the arguments for, and the nature of, the Lakatosian model of Science, which draws on the influential work of Popper and Kuhn, whilst avoiding some of the key criticisms of their models. It has been argued that RP in the social sciences can be characterised as SRP if they meet Lakatos’ criteria. Chapter 4 [A Scientific Research Programme Within Science Education] will apply the Lakatosian model of RP to the ‘constructivist’ tradition of research into learning in science."

The next chapter is A Scientific Research Programme Within Science Education