A topic in research methodology
Ontological questions examine the nature of things – for example whether they should be considered real or imaginary; whether they can be considered objectively real, and so independent of a particular observer. For example, is 'classroom atmosphere' something real? If it is, is it something can be studied objectively in that different observers should be expected to experience it in the same way?
Read about the importance of ontology in research
Ontology goes beyond questions of existence to ask about the nature of things. So, on topic that can be considered 'ontological' is how we classify using schemes such as typologies.
Typology
Typology is the study of how things are analysed and classified into types according to their properties/characteristics. A 'typology' is such a classification scheme.
Typologies of humans
As one example, consider the question 'what types of humans are there?'
One possible classification might adults and children in which case there may be a question of the nature of the distinction (e.g., does everyone fit in one type of the other – should there be another intermediate class of adolescents?)
A totally different answer to the same question might divide humans into
- Homo sapiens
- Homo erectus
- Homo neanderthalensis
- Homo habilis
- …
When such distinctions are considered to be absolute, then the categories may be considered to represent 'natural kinds', different classes of things that naturally occur in nature.
Historically, a very significant question of typology involved dividing human beings into 'races', and to then characterise the different races. This is quite a shameful episode in the history of science, as it often fell well short of the notion of objective, unbiased science, but was rather often based on prejudices (e.g., about superiority) which were completely counter to the evidence.
We now know, at least from a scientific perspective, there are no distinct human 'races' (race is not a scientific category, not a natural kind). The concept of race is still widely used, of course, but it is a social category not a biological one.
That is not to say that populations from different parts of the world do not differ on average on some characteristics and in gene frequencies, and that this cannot have implications (for example, in the incidence of sickle cell disease or lactose intolerance) – but the human species Homo sapiens shares a gene pool which does not neatly break down into 'racial' groups.
Indeed, strictly, even those different those different human species I've listed above do not make up entirely self-contained categories where any specimen must belong in one group or another.
Read about 'Intergenerational couplings in the family: A thought experiment about ancestry'
At one time it was assumed that Neanderthals had lived alongside the ancestors of modern humans, and had either been competed for resources, or possibly had been actively killed off by 'our' kind. We now know the Neanderthals did not entirely die out. Most, if not all, of us carry some genetic markers showing we have some Neanderthals among our ancestors. Neanderthals did not only live alongside Homo sapiens – at least some of them interacted very intimately with them.
The idea that different species were absolutely distinct was overthrown by the work of Darwin. So, in biological taxonomy today we have to be aware that typologies we may use will not be absolute.
Typologies of schools
As another example, consider schools. Clearly not all schools are the same, and there are various ways me might think it useful to classify them. Thinking about the categories we might use and the nature of those categories (are they absolutely distinct? do they collectively coverall cases of 'schools'); and thinking about the nature of the characteristics we use to make the classifications can be considered ontology.
In educational research we might divide schools into public and independent sector, single gender or co-educational, mixed ability or selective. However, if using classes is important to be aware of the nature of these classifications.
For example, are there intermediate cases? An example, might be schools that are independent but have places for some students sponsored by the state, as used to be the case in England at one time. Or a comprehensive school that has a non-selective admissions policy, but co-exists with a local grammar school that selects on examination performance and may be considered to distort the ability profile of the comprehensive school by 'creaming-off' most of the highest achievers.
An typology from science education
One major issue in science teaching is that often students have existing ideas before teaching (sometimes called alternative conceptions) which are inconsistent with target knowledge, and that conceptual change is then often (not always) difficult. One theory about why this often is was produced by Michelene Chi and her colleagues (e.g., Chi, Slotta & de Leeuw, 1994).
Chi’s ontology
Chi thought that people tend to implicitly (but not usually consciously) understand all the entities in the world as existing on three 'trees' of concepts, each subdivided into various 'branches', one of matter, one of processes, and one of mental states. These different types of entity were so different that concepts could not be moved from one 'tree' to another by changing one's mind about the nature of that entity.
Yet, it is known that many things that scientists feel are best understood as a processes tend to be intuitively considered material. Heat for example may be understood as flow of some kind of 'stuff'. This was argued to explain why some kinds of conceptual change were so difficult. 2
A typology of learning impediments
Deriving from work in science education, but likely to be of wider significance is the typology of learning impediments that sets out categories of ways there can be a mismatch between the way teaching is understood, and how it was intended (Taber, 2001 [Download this article]).
Read about types of learning impediments
Source cited:
- Chi, M. T. H., Slotta, J. D., & de Leeuw, N. (1994). From things to processes; a theory of conceptual change for learning science concepts. Learning and Instruction, 4, 27-43.
- Taber, K. S. (2001). The mismatch between assumed prior knowledge and the learner's conceptions: a typology of learning impediments. Educational Studies, 27(2), 159-171. [Download this article]
- Taber, K. S. (2013). Classroom-based Research and Evidence-based Practice: An introduction (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Notes:
1 Even in this case there might be complications. For example, if a Bunsen burner is so damaged that it is not serviceable, should it be included in the count? (Probably not.) If a Bunsen burner is not currently being used because its rubber hose has perished, should it be counted? (Probably yes, as it can easily be fitted with some new hose.) Without some such criteria different observers may produce different counts.
2 Yes, we can have a typology of conceptual change: a common distinction that is made is between changes that are primarily accretion of new learning around existing learning, and learning that requires substantive modification of prior thinking.
My introduction to educational research:
Taber, K. S. (2013). Classroom-based Research and Evidence-based Practice: An introduction (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
