Tag: scientific theories

Surface tension is due to everybody trying to get into the water

Surely you are joking, Prof. Feynman? 1

Keith S. Taber

Photo of Richard Feynman, taken in 1984 © Tamiko Thiel (accessed from Wikipedia and shared under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported)

The late, great, Richard Feynman

Richard Feynman was special. Any one who wins the Nobel prize has to be pretty special, but physics laureate Feynman was even more remarkable as he was an exceptionally high achieving research physicist also known for his…teaching. No one gets a Nobel for being a good teacher, and it is often considered in Academia that teaching (that is, if one tries to give teaching the time and energy required to do it well – as students deserve) distracts from research to such an extent that it is rare to excel in both.

Feynman had something a lot of scientists do not not: great charisma. (That is no insult to fellow scientists – most plumbers and greengrocers and bus drivers and accountants and hairdressers do not – that is what makes it notable). He might be considered the Albert Einstein of the second half of the twentieth century, and because of that timescale we are lucky to have quality recordings of him talking and teaching in a way that could not have happened with previous generations. (A great shame in many cases: if perhaps a blessing with some – Isaac Newton's lectures were apparently avoided by most of his own students.)

Like many people, I find Feynman bewitching – he had a sparkle about him – almost a permanent mischievous twinkle in the eye – and an ability to somehow express the excitement of science (of working out why things are as they are) whilst being able to talk in ways that could be understood by people that lacked his expertise. That is perhaps one trait of a great teacher – being able to talk at the level of the audience, despite personally understanding at a higher, more complex and subtle, level.

That is by way of preamble – as I want to consider an explanation Feynman once offered of surface tension.

Screenshot of Richard Feynman explaining why water forms into drops.

Why does it rain in drops?

The extract I am discussing is taken from a 1983 BBC series of short episodes in a series called 'Fun to Imagine'. Although, at the time of writing, the episodes are "not currently available" from the BBC site, there is a compilation on YouTube. One of the topics Feynman discusses is the origin of surface tension – although he only introduces the technical term after explaining the phenomenon that water forms into droplets,

"you see a little drop of water, a tiny drop
And the atoms [sic, molecules] attract each other, they like to be next to each other
They want as many partners as they can get
Now the guys that are at the surface have only partners on one side
here, in the air on the other side, so they're trying to get in
And you can imagine…this teeming people, all moving very fast
all trying to have as many partners as possible and the guys at the edge are very unhappy and nervous and they keep pounding in
trying to get in, and that makes it a tight ball instead of a flat
and that's what, you know, surface tension
When you realise when you see how sometimes a water drop sits like this on a table then you start to imagine why it's like that
because everybody is trying to get into the water"

Richard Feynman speaking in 1983

Is this a good explanation?

Well, we might suggest Feynman makes a schoolchild error – water is not an atomic substance, but molecular. It does not contain discrete atoms, so he should be referring to the molecules attracting each other. But I do not think this is an error in the sense that Feynman was mistaken, simply that although the distinction is of great importance in chemistry, physicists sometimes use the term 'atom' generically to refer to the individual particles in a gas, for example. That might be unhelpful to a secondary school student studying for examinations, but if Feynman thought of his television audience for the recording as lay people, the general public, then perhaps the distinction between atoms (arguably a more familiar term in everyday discourse) and molecules would be considered an unhelpful detail? I am certainly prepared to give him that. I think it was the wrong choice, but not that Feynman was in error.

But what about the overall argument here. The 'atoms' want to have partners all around them 2 so they try to get inside the volume of the liquid. The overall effect of everyone, including these guys at the edge, trying to get inside the water is that it forms a sphere-like shape: "a tight ball instead of [something more] flat". Is that a convincing explanation – and is it a valid one?

What makes for a good explanation?

If anything is central to both science and science teaching, it is explanation.

"Explanation would seem to be central to the essence of science. A naïve view might claim that science discovers knowledge about the World, although it might be more accurate to suggest that science creates knowledge through the development of theories. The theories are used in turn to understand, predict and sometimes control the world, and in these activities, scientific explanations play the key role. We might consider theories and models to be the resources of science, but explanations to be the active processes through which theory is applied to contexts of interest…

An explanation is an answer to a 'why' question: but that in itself neither makes for a good explanation, nor for a scientific one. There is no simple answer to what does count as a good explanation, in science or elsewhere. Explanations have audiences, and to some extent, a good explanation is one that satisfied its audience – in other words it meets the explainee's purpose in seeking an explanation. Additionally, it has been known since at least Aristotle's time that we can talk of different kinds of causes, which suggests that many 'why questions' might have different types of acceptable responses, depending on the type of cause being sought."

Taber, 2007, p.159 [Download the chapter]

That passage is taken from a chapter where I described some activities used with secondary school students to help teach them about the nature of scientific explanation. (Read about the classroom activities here.) In that context, working with learners who were about 14 years of age, students were told that a good scientific explanation would be logical, and would draw upon scientific theory,

"pupils were told that scientific explanations needed to take into account logic and theory, i.e., that the explanation needs to be rational, and the explanation needs to draw upon accepted scientific ideas. As the notion of 'theory' is itself known to be difficult for students, they were also told that scientific theories are ideas about the world which are well supported by evidence; are internally consistent; and which usually fit with other accepted theories."

Taber, 2007, p.159 [Download the chapter]

Feynman's explanation is logical (if incomplete)

In that regard, Feynman's explanation can be considered logical, even if it omits (i.e., he takes as assumed) an important step* that is needed to explain the (approximately) spherical shape of the water drop.

If water quanticles (let's leave aside whether they are atoms or molecules) want to have many partners 2, and so try to get inside the volume, then we can understand* that the water drop will tend to the smallest surface area possible, so as few quanticles end up at the surface (with the tenuous air, rather than congregating water partners, on one side) where they will be nervous, and as many quanticles as possible are in the interior of the drop where they will be happy.

* The missing step is to state that a spherical drop will have a smaller surface area than any other shape with the same volume and so fewest quanticles at the surface. Perhaps Feynman assumed everyone would know/see that. Probably there is no such thing as a totally complete explanation.

So, is this a good explanation?

Explanations can have different purposes. Scientific explanations allow us to make effective predictions (and so often to control situations – the application of science through technology). But, in everyday life, explanations have a more subjective purpose ("explanations have audiences, and to some extent, a good explanation is one that satisfied its audience").

If, as a result of hearing Feynman's explanation, the viewers of the BBC televison programme

  • felt they now understood why sphere-like drops of water form, and
  • considered they had made sense of some science, and so
  • appreciated the value of science in explaining everyday phenomena,

then perhaps the explanation achieved its purpose?

Was Feynman's explanation scientific?

Of course, if I am being my usual pedantic self, I could point out that although Feynman's explanation was logical, that does not make it scientific unless it also drew upon accepted scientific principles. It was logical because the explicandum (what was to be explained – here, the drop shape) followed from the premise (i.e., if water quanticles want to have many partners, and act accordingly, then…)

But, in science, quanticles are not understood as sentient actors, but as inanimate entities that are not (and cannot be) aware of their situation and cannot act deliberately to work towards personal goals. Therefore, no matter how convincing someone may have found this explanation, it does not qualify as a scientific explanation as it is not based on accepted scientific principles (…or at least, not directly).

An anthropomorphic explanation

Feynman's explanation uses anthropomorphism, which from a scientific perspective makes it a pseudo-explanation. A pseudo-explanation takes the form of an explanation in that it is presented as if an answer to a why question, but does meet the requirements for a formal explanation (e.g., it does "not logically fit the phenomenon to be explained into a wider conceptual scheme", Taber & Watts, 2000.)

There are various kinds of pseudo-explanations such as tautology (circular explanations that rely on the conclusions as premises) and simply offering a label for the explicandum (e.g., water absorbs a lot of heat for a small change in its temperature because it has a high heat capacity – this is a kind of disguised tautology, as a 'high heat capacity' is a way of characterising something that absorbs a lot of heat for a small change in its temperature).

Read about pseudo-explanations

Anthropomorphism explains by assuming that the entities involved can be considered to be like people, and, so, to be sentient, have feelings and opinions and preferences, and be able to plan and carry out actions that are intended to being about desired consequences.

It relies on an analogy that may not be appropriate:

  • if people were in a situation like this, they are likely to behave in a certain way
  • if we treat these entities as if they were people then we might expect them to behave as people would, therefore…

It is an open question to what extent we can assume animals (chimpanzees, dogs, birds, etc.) can be considered to share aspects of human-like experiences, emotions, thoughts, etcetera. Perhaps it is reasonable to suggest a dog can be sad or a chimp can be jealous. It may not be stretching credibility to suggest that members of some species of animals want to be in large groups, like to be in large groups, and perhaps may even get nervous when isolated? However, it stretches credibility when we are told that viruses are clever or that a bacterium can be happy.

And, there is a pretty strong scientific consensus that at the level of individual molecules there is no possibility of emotions, opinions, desires, thoughts, or deliberate actions. Atoms do not want to fill their electron shells, and genes cannot be selfish, except in a figurative sense.

Read about anthropomorphism

So, in order to accept Feynman's explanation as valid, we would have to assume that the quanticles in water, water molecules,

  • like to be next to each other
  • want as many partners as they can get 2
  • can be unhappy and nervous
  • try to have as many partners as possible 2
  • try to get into the inside of the volume

So, to find this explanation convincing, we have to accept (contrary to science) that something like a water molecule is able to

  1. have desires and preferences,
  2. be aware of the extent to which is current situation matches its preferences, and,
  3. deliberately act to bring about desired outcomes

[Feynman does not explicitly state that the quanticles know about their situation (point 2), but clearly this is implied as otherwise they would have no reason to be nervous and unhappy, nor to act to bring about change.]

These requirements are clearly not met. A being with a central nervous system as complex as a human can meet these requirements, but there is no conceivable mechanism by which molecules can be considered sentient, or to be deliberate agents in the world.

So, even if Feynman's explanation of surface tension satisfies viewers of the recording (i.e., is is subjectively an effective explanation) it fails as an objective, scientific, explanation. Feynman may indeed have been a 'genius' (Gleick, 1994), and a great physicist, but his explanation here is invalid and simply fails as good science.

Now a reader may suspect I have gone after a 'straw man' target here. Surely, Feynman was speaking figuratively, and not literally. Of course he was, but figurative language cannot support a logical explanation, except through an analogy we suspect to hold.

Consider the following hypothetical claim and two possible consequences if the claim was true

ClaimConsequence 1Consequence 2
"I managed to get tickets for Toyah and Fripp's sold out concert in Bury St Edmunds, and these tickets are gold dust.""I could sell these tickets at quite a mark up""I could put a sample of these tickets in a mass spectrometer and would find they had an atomic mass of 197."

If the claim was literally true, then consequence 2 would follow. But of course, it is meant as a figurative claim, where 'gold dust' is a metaphor for something of high value because it is rare. So, actually consequence 1 might follow, but not consequence 2.

In the same way, if water particles do not have likes, and do not try to do things, Fenyman's argument seems to fall apart…

A teaching model?

Now I would not presume to know better than Richard Feynman, and I am pretty sure (i.e., about as certain as I can be of anything) that Feynman would not have fallen into the mistake of thinking that atoms or molecules actually act like humans and want things, or try to do things. He surely knew this was not a scientific explanation, but he clearly thought this was a useful way of explaining (to his audience) why water forms into a drop.

Now, I suggested above that Feynman's narrative account of the origin of surface tension "is not based on accepted scientific principles (…or at least, not directly)". But near the outset of this account Feynman states that the water particles "attract each other":

"the [molecules] attract each other, they like to be next to each other"

Feynman was not only a researcher, but a teacher, and teachers use teaching models. I think this is what Feynman is doing here:

"[according to science] the [molecules] attract each other [and we can think of this as if] they like to be next to each other"

Affinity in the sense of human experience is used as a kind of analogy for the affinity between water molecules (which leads to hydrogen bonding and dipole-dipole interactions). Once we model inter-molecular forces as being like attractions between people, we can extend the analogy in terms of how people feel when they do not get what they want, and how they respond by acting in ways that they hope will get them what they want.

Looked at this way, Feynman is doing something that good teachers often do when they judge a scientific model is too abstract, sophisticated, complex, subtle, for their audience; they simplify by substituting a teaching model which represents the scientific model in terms more familiar and accessible to the learners.

Read about making the unfamiliar familiar

From this perspective, Feynman's explanation may not have been a valid scientific explanation, but we might ask if it was an effective intermediate explanation set out in terms of a teaching model. That is, perhaps Feynman's explanation may have satisfied viewers, and also potentially acted as a possible foundation for building up to a more technical, scientifically acceptable explanation.

Teachers and other science communicators often use anthropomorphism as a way of offering accounts of complex scientific topics that will appeal and make sense to learners of a public audience.

Read about anthropomorphism in accounts of science

This can be effective to the extent that it engages learners, leaves the audience with a subjective sense of making sense of the science, and provides accounts that are often remembered later.

Of course that is not so helpful if the audience is studying a science course, and think they have learnt an account which will get them credit in formal examinations! I know from my own teaching career that learners often find anthropomorphic explanations readily come to mind, even when then they have been taught more technical accounts they are expected to apply when assessed.

In public science communication, then, anthropomorphic accounts may be valuable in offering people some sense of the science. But in formal education we need to be careful as even if anthropomorphism offers a useful way of getting learners familiar with some abstract topic (what might be called 'weak' anthropomorphism: Taber & Watts, 1996), we need to avoid them learning and committing to that metaphoric 'social' account thinking it is a valid scientific account ('strong' anthropomorphism).

Mapping Feynman's explanation

If we see Feynman as offering an analogy as a teaching model then we might seek to 'translate' his terms into more scientific concepts. He tells us that attraction is 'liking', and we can perhaps think of 'wanting' and being 'nervous' as indicating a higher (excited) energy state, 'pounding' as being subject to unbalanced forces, and 'trying to get in' as tending to evolving toward a lower energy configuration. At least, someone who already understood the scientific account could suggest such mappings. It seems unlikely any one who did not appreciate the science already could interpret it that way without a knowing and careful guide.

And like all anthropomorphic explanations, it 'suffers' from the very quality that it offers a narrative which is likely to be more easily understood, better related to, and more readily recalled, than the scientific account. This is why I have very mixed feelings about the use of anthropomorphism in formal science teaching, as even when it (a) does a great job of engaging learners and offering them some level of understanding, this may be at the cost of (b) offering an account which many students will find it hard to later let go of and progress beyond.

Screenshot of Richard Feynman explaining why water forms into drops.

As a good teacher, Feynman would know to pitch his teaching for particular audiences depending on their likely level of background knowledge. The explanation discussed here was not how Feynman taught about surface tension in his undergraduate classes at the California Institute of Technology (Feynman, Leighton & Sands, 1963). We can imagine that had he told students at Caltech that water formed into spherical drops because all the molecular guys are trying to get into the water, he might indeed had heard the retort: Surely you are joking, Prof. Feynman? 1

Work cited:

Notes:

1 My subtitle is a reference to the book 'Surely you're Joking Mr Feynman: Adventures of a Curious Character' in which Feynman tells anecdotes from his life.

2 Water was perhaps a poor example to choose as there is extensive hydrogen bonding in liquid water,

"I suspect even some experienced chemists may underestimate the extent of hydrogen bonding in water. According to one source…, in liquid water at the freezing point, the typical water molecule is at any time bonded by three or four hydrogen bonds – compared with the four bonds in the solid ice structure."

Taber, 2020, p.98

So, in Feynman's analogy, a water molecules does not become happy (lower energy state) when it is surrounded by as many other water molecules as possible, but when it is aligned with 3 or 4 other molecules to hydrogen bond, if only transiently. Without the hydrogen bonding, the drop would still be approximately spherical, but it would be smaller and denser as the molecules could get even closer together, but it would evaporate away more readily.

Baking fresh electrons for the science doughnut

Faster-than-light electrons race from a sitting start and are baked to give off light brighter than millions of suns that can be used to image tiny massage balls: A case of science communication

Keith S. Taber

(The pedantic science teacher)

Ockham's razor

Ockham's razor (also known as Occam's razor) is a principle that is sometimes applied as a heuristic in science, suggesting that explanations should not be unnecessarily complicated. Faced with a straightforward explanation, and an alternative convoluted explanation, then all other things being equal we should prefer the former – not simply accept it, but to treat is as the preferred hypothesis to test out first.

Ockham's Razor is also an ABC radio show offering "a soap box for all things scientific, with short talks about research, industry and policy from people with something thoughtful to say about science". The show used to offer recorded essays (akin to the format of BBC's A Point of View), but now tends to record short live talks.

I've just listened to an episode called The 'science donut' – in fact I listened several time as I thought it was fascinating – as in a few minutes there was much to attend to.

The 'Science Donut': a recent episode of Ockham's Razor

I approached the episode as someone with an interest in science, of course, but also as an educator with an ear to the ways in which we communicate science in teaching. Teachers do not simply present sequences of information about science, but engage pedagogy (i.e., strategies and techniques to support learning). Other science communicators (whether journalists, or scientists themselves directly addressing the public) use many of the same techniques. Teaching conceptual material (such as science principles, theories, models…) can be seen as making the unfamiliar familiar, and the constructivist perspective on how learning occurs suggests this is supported by showing the learner how that which is currently still unfamiliar, is in some way like something familiar, something they already have some knowledge/experience of.

Science communicators may not be trained as teachers, so may sometimes be using these techniques in a less considered or even less deliberate manner. That is, people use analogy, metaphor, simile, and so forth, as a normal part of everyday talk to such an extent that these tropes may be generated automatically, in effect, implicitly. When we are regularly talking about an area of expertise we almost do not have to think through what we are going to say. 1

Science communicators also often have much less information about their audience than teachers: a radio programme/podcast, for example, can be accessed by people of a wide range of background knowledge and levels of formal qualifications.

One thing teachers often learn to do very early in their careers is to slow down the rate of introducing new information, and focus instead on a limited number of key points they most want to get across. Sometimes science in the media is very dense in the frequency of information presented or the background knowledge being drawn upon. (See, for example, 'Genes on steroids? The high density of science communication'.)

A beamline scientist

Dr Emily Finch, who gave this particular radio talk, is a beamline scientist at the Australian Synchrotron. Her talk began by recalling how her family visited the Synchrotron facility on an open day, and how she later went on to work there.

She then gave an outline of the functioning of the synchrotron and some examples of its applications. Along the way there were analogies, metaphors, anthropomorphism, and dubiously fast electrons.

The creation of the god particle

To introduce the work of the particle accelerator, Dr Finch reminded her audience of the research to detect the Higgs boson.

"Do you remember about 10 years ago scientists were trying to make the Higgs boson particle? I see some nods. They sometimes call it the God particle and they had a theory it existed, but they had not been able to prove it yet. So, they decided to smash together two beams of protons to try to make it using the CERN large hadron collider in Switzerland…You might remember that they did make a Higgs boson particle".

This is a very brief summary of a major research project that involved hundreds of scientists and engineers from a great many countries working over years. But this abbreviation is understandable as this was not Dr Finch's focus, but rather an attempt to link her actual focus, the Australian Synchrotron, to something most people will already know something about.

However, aspects of this summary account may have potential to encourage the development of, or reinforce an existing, common alternative conception shared by many learners. This is regarding the status of theories.

In science, theories are 'consistent, comprehensive, coherent and extensively evidenced explanations of aspects of the natural world', yet students often understand theories to be nothing more than just ideas, hunches, guesses – conjectures at best (Taber, Billingsley, Riga & Newdick, 2015). In a very naive take on the nature of science, a scientist comes up with an idea ('theory') which is tested, and is either 'proved' or rejected.

This simplistic take is wrong in two regards – something does not become an established scientific theory until it is supported by a good deal of evidence; and scientific ideas are not simply proved or disproved by testing, but rather become better supported or less credible in the light of the interpretation of data. Strictly scientific ideas are never finally proved to become certain knowledge, but rather remain as theories. 2

In everyday discourse, people will say 'I have a theory' to mean no more that 'I have a suggestion'.

A pedantic scientist or science teacher might be temped to respond:

"no you don't, not yet,"

This is sometimes not the impression given by media accounts – presumably because headlines such as 'research leads to scientist becoming slightly more confident in theory' do not have the same impact as 'cure found', 'discovery made, or 'theory proved'.

Read about scientific certainty in the media

The message that could be taken away here is that scientists had the idea that Higgs boson existed, but they had not been able to prove it till they were able to make one. But the CERN scientists did not have a Higgs boson to show the press, only the data from highly engineered detectors, analysed through highly complex modelling. Yet that analysis suggested they had recorded signals that closely matched what they expected to see when a short lived Higgs decayed allowing them to conclude that it was very likely one had been formed in the experiment. The theory motivating their experiment was strongly supported – but not 'proved' in an absolute sense.

The doughnut

Dr Finch explained that

"we do have one of these particle accelerators here in Australia, and it's called the Australian Synchrotron, or as it is affectionately known the science donut

…our synchrotron is a little different from the large hadron collider in a couple of main ways. So, first, we just have the one beam instead of two. And second, our beam is made of electrons instead of protons. You remember electrons, right, they are those tiny little negatively charged particles and they sit in the shells around the atom, the centre of the atom."

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor

One expects that members of the audience would be able to respond to this description and (due to previous exposure to such representations) picture images of atoms with electrons in shells. 'Shells' is of course a kind of metaphor here, even if one which with continual use has become a so-called 'dead metaphor'. Metaphor is a common technique used by teachers and other communicators to help make the unfamiliar familiar. In some simplistic models of atomic structure, electrons are considered to be arranged in shells (the K shell, the L shell, etc.), and a simple notation for electronic configuration based on these shells is still often used (e.g., Na as 2.8.1).

Read about science metaphors

However, this common way of talking about shells has the potential to mislead learners. Students can, and sometimes do, develop the alternative conception that atoms have actual physical shells of some kind, into which the electrons are located. The shells scientists refer to are abstractions, but may be misinterpreted as material entities, as actual shells. The use of anthropomorphic language, that is that the electrons "sit in the shells", whilst helping to make the abstract ideas familiar and so perhaps comfortable, can reinforce this. After all, it is difficult to sit in empty space without support.

The subatomic grand prix?

Dr Finch offers her audience an analogy for the synchrotron: the electrons "are zipping around. I like to think of it kind of like a racetrack." Analogy is another common technique used by teachers and other communicators to help make the unfamiliar familiar.

Read about science analogies

Dr Finch refers to the popularity of the Australian Formula 1 (F1) Grand Prix that takes place in Melbourne, and points out

"Now what these race enthusiasts don't know is that just a bit further out of the city we have a race track that is operating six days a week that is arguably far more impressive.

That's right, it is the science donut. The difference is that instead of having F1s doing about 300 km an hour, we have electrons zipping around at the speed of light. That's about 300 thousand km per second.

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor

There is an interesting slippage – perhaps a deliberate rhetoric flourish – from the synchrotron being "kind of like a racetrack" (a simile) to being "a race track" (a metaphor). Although racing electrons lacks a key attraction of an F1 race (different drivers of various nationalities driving different cars built by competing teams presented in different livery – whereas who cares which of myriad indistinguishable electrons would win a race?) that does not undermine the impact of the mental imagery encouraged by this analogy.

This can be understood as an analogy rather than just a simile or metaphor as Dr Finch maps out the comparison:

target conceptanalogue
a synchotrona racetrack
operates six days a week[Many in the audience would have known that the Melbourne Grand Prix takes place on a 'street circuit' that is only set up for racing one weekend each year.]
racing electronsracing 'F1s' (i.e., Grand Prix cars)
at the speed of light at about 300 km an hour
An analogy between the Australian Synchrotron and the Melbourne Grand Prix circuit

So, here is an attempt to show how science has something just like the popular race track, but perhaps even more impressive – generating speeds orders of magnitude greater than even Lewis Hamilton could drive.

They seem to like their F1 comparisons at the Australian Synchrotron. I found another ABC programme ('The Science Show') where Nobel Laureate "Brian Schmidt explains, the synchrotron is not being used to its best capability",

"the analogy here is that we invested in a $200 million Ferrari and decided that we wouldn't take it out of first gear and do anything other than drive it around the block. So it seems a little bit of a waste"

Brian Schmidt (Professor of Astronomy, and Vice Chancellor, at Australian National University)
A Ferrari being taken for a spin around the block in Melbourne (Image by Lee Chandler from Pixabay )

How fast?

But did Dr Finch suggest there that the electrons were travelling at the speed of light? Surely not? Was that a slip of the tongue?

"So, we bake our electrons fresh in-house using an electron gun. So, this works like an old cathode ray tube that we used to have in old TVs. So, we have this bit of tungsten metal and we heat it up and when it gets red hot it shoots out electrons into a vacuum. We then speed up the electrons, and once they leave the electron gun they are already travelling at about half the speed of light. We then speed them up even more, and after twelve metres, they are already going at the speed of light….

And it is at this speed that we shoot them off into a big ring called the booster ring, where we boost their energy. Once their energy is high enough we shoot them out again into another outer ring called the storage ring."

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor

So, no, the claim is that the electrons are accelerated to the speed of light within twelve metres, and then have their energy boosted even more.

But this is contrary to current physics. According to the currently accepted theories, and specifically the special theory of relativity, only entities which have zero rest mass, such as photons, can move at the speed of light.

Electrons have a tiny mass by everyday standards (about 0.000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 001 g), but they are still 'massive' particles (i.e., particles with mass) and it would take infinite energy to accelerate a single tiny electron to the speed of light. So, given our current best understanding, this claim cannot be right.

I looked to see what was reported on the website of the synchrotron itself.

The electron beam travels just under the speed of light – about 299,792 kilometres a second.

https://www.ansto.gov.au/research/facilities/australian-synchrotron/overview

Strictly the electrons do not travel at the speed of light but very nearly the speed of light.

The speed of light in a vacuum is believed to be 299 792 458 ms-1 (to the nearest metre per second), but often in science we are working to limited precision, so this may be rounded to 2.998 ms-1 for many purposes. Indeed, sometimes 3 x 108 ms-1 is good enough for so-called 'back of the envelope' calculations. So, in a sense, Dr Finch was making a similar approximation.

But this is one approximation that a science teacher might want to avoid, as electrons travelling at the speed of light may be approximately correct, but is also thought to be physically impossible. That is, although the difference in magnitude between

  • (i) the maximum electron speeds achieved in the synchrotron, and
  • (ii) the speed of light,

might be a tiny proportional difference – conceptually the distinction is massive in terms of modern physics. (I imagine Dr Finch is aware of all this, but perhaps her background in geology does not make this seem as important as it might appear to a physics teacher.)

Dr Finch does not explicitly say that the electrons ever go faster than the speed of light (unlike the defence lawyer in a murder trial who claimed nervous impulses travel faster than the speed of light) but I wonder how typical school age learners would interpret "they are already going at the speed of light….And it is at this speed that we shoot them off into a big ring called the booster ring, where we boost their energy". I assume that refers to maintaining their high speeds to compensate for energy transfers from the beam: but only because I think Dr Finch cannot mean accelerating them beyond the speed of light. 3

The big doughnut

After the reference to how "we bake our electrons fresh in-house", Dr Finch explains

And so it is these two rings, these inner and outer rings, that give the synchrotron its nick name, the science donut. Just like two rings of delicious baked electron goodness…

So, just to give you an idea of scale here, this outer ring, the storage ring, is about forty one metres across, so it's a big donut."

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor
A big doughnut? The Australian Synchrotron (Source Australia's Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation)

So, there is something of an extended metaphor here. The doughnut is so-called because of its shape, but this doughnut (a bakery product) is used to 'bake' electrons.

If audience members were to actively reflect on and seek to analyse this metaphor then they might notice an incongruity, perhaps a mixed metaphor, as the synchrotron seems to shift from being that which is baked (a doughnut) to that doing the baking (baking the electrons). Perhaps the electrons are the dough, but, if so, they need to go into the oven.

But, of course, humans implicitly process language in real time, and poetic language tends to be understood intuitively without needing reflection. So, a trope such as this may 'work' to get across the flavour (sorry) of an idea, even if under close analysis (by our pedantic science teacher again) the metaphor appears only half-baked.

Perverting the electrons

Dr Finch continued

"Now the electrons like to travel in straight lines, so to get them to go round the rings we have to bend them using magnets. So, we defect the electrons around the corners [sic] using electromagnetic fields from the magnets, and once we do this the electrons give off a light, called synchrotron light…

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor

Now electrons are not sentient and do not have preferences in the way that someone might prefer to go on a family trip to the local synchrotron rather than a Formula 1 race. Electrons do not like to go in straight lines. They fit with Newton's first law – the law of inertia. An electron that is moving ('travelling') will move ('travel') in a straight line unless there is net force to pervert it. 4

If we describe this as electrons 'liking' to travel in straight lines it would be just as true to say electrons 'like' to travel at a constant speed. Language that assigns human feelings and motives and thoughts to inanimate objects is described as anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphism is a common way of making the unfamiliar familiar, and it is often used in relation to molecules, electrons, atoms and so forth. Sadly, when learners pick up this kind of language, they do not always appreciate that it is just meant metaphorically!

Read about anthropomorphism

The brilliant light

Dr Finch tells her audience that

"This synchrotron light is brighter than a million suns, and we capture it using special equipment that comes off that storage ring.

And this equipment will focus and tune and shape that beam of synchrotron light so we can shoot it at samples like a LASER."

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor

Whether the radiation is 'captured' is a moot point, as it no longer exists once it has been detected. But what caught my attention here was the claim that the synchrotron radiation was brighter than a million suns. Not because I necessarily thought this bold claim was 'wrong', but rather I did not understand what it meant.

The statement seems sensible at first hearing, and clearly it means qualitatively that the radiation is very intense. But what did the quantitative comparison actually mean? I turned again to the synchrotron webpage. I did not find an answer there, but on the site of a UK accelerator I found

"These fast-moving electrons produce very bright light, called synchrotron light. This very intense light, predominantly in the X-ray region, is millions of times brighter than light produced from conventional sources and 10 billion times brighter than the sun."

https://www.diamond.ac.uk/Home/About/FAQs/About-Synchrotrons.html#

Sunlight spreads out and its intensity drops according to an inverse square law. Move twice as far away from a sun, and the radiation intensity drops to a quarter of what it was when you were closer. Move to ten times as far away from the sun than before, and the intensity is 1% of what it was up close.

The synchrotron 'light' is being shaped into a beam "like a LASER". A LASER produces a highly collimated beam – that is, the light does not (significantly) spread out. This is why football hooligans choose LASER pointers rather than conventional torches to intimidate players from a safe distance in the crowd.

Comparing light with like

This is why I do not understand how the comparison works, as the brightness of a sun depends how close you are too it – a point previously discussed here in relation to NASA's Parker solar probe (NASA puts its hand in the oven). If I look out at the night sky on a clear moonlight night then surely I am exposed to light from more "than a million suns" but most of them are so far away I cannot even make them out. Indeed there are faint 'nebulae' I can hardly perceive that are actually galaxies shining with the brightness of billions of suns. 5 If that is the comparison, then I am not especially impressed by something being "brighter than a million suns".

How bright is the sun? it depends which planet you are observing from. (Images by AD_Images and Gerd Altmann from Pixabay)

We are told not to look directly at the sun as it can damage our eyes. But a hypothetical resident of Neptune or Uranus could presumably safely stare at the sun (just as we can safely stare at much brighter stars than our sun because they are so far away). So we need to ask :"brighter than a million suns", as observed from how far away?

How bright is the sun? That depends on viewing conditions
(Image by UteHeineSch from Pixabay)

Even if referring to our Sun as seen from the earth, the brightness varies according to its apparent altitude in the sky. So, "brighter than a million suns" needs to be specified further – as perhaps "more than a million times brighter than the sun as seen at midday from the equator on a cloudless day"? Of course, again, only the pedantic science teacher is thinking about this: everyone knows well enough what being brighter than a million suns implies. It is pretty intense radiation.

Applying the technology

Dr Finch went on to discuss a couple of applications of the synchrotron. One related to identifying pigments in art masterpieces. The other was quite timely in that it related to investigating the infectious agent in COVID.

"Now by now you have probably seen an image of the COVID virus – it looks like a ball with some spikes on it. Actually it kind of looks like those massage balls that your physio makes you buy when you turn thirty and need to to ease all your physical ailments that you suddenly have."

Dr Emily Finch talking on Ockham's Razor
Coronavirus particles and massage balls…or is it…
(Images by Ulrike Leone and Daniel Roberts from Pixabay)

Again there is an attempt to make the unfamiliar familiar. These microscopic virus particles are a bit like something familiar from everyday life. Such comparisons are useful where the everyday object is already familiar.

By now I've seen plenty of images of the coronavirus responsible for COVID, although I do not have a physiotherapist (perhaps this is a cultural difference – Australians being so sporty?) So, I found myself using this comparison in reverse – imagining that the "massage balls that your physio makes you buy" must be like larger versions of coronavirus particles. Having looked up what these massage balls (a.k.a. hedgehog balls it seems) look like, I can appreciate the similarity. Whether the manufacturers of massage balls will appreciate their products being compared to enormous coronavirus particles is, perhaps, another matter.

Work cited:
  • Taber, K. S., Billingsley, B., Riga, F., & Newdick, H. (2015). English secondary students' thinking about the status of scientific theories: consistent, comprehensive, coherent and extensively evidenced explanations of aspects of the natural world – or just 'an idea someone has'. The Curriculum Journal, 1-34. doi: 10.1080/09585176.2015.1043926
Notes:

1 At least, depending how we understand 'thinking'. Clearly there are cognitive processes at work even when we continue a conversation 'on auto pilot' (to employ a metaphor) whilst consciously focusing on something else. Only a tiny amount of our cognitive processing (thinking?) occurs within conscousness where we reflect and deliberate (i.e., explicit thinking?) We might label the rest as 'implicit thinking', but this processing varies greatly in its closeness to deliberation – and some aspects (for example, word recognition when listening to speech; identifying the face of someone we see) might seem to not deserve the label 'thinking'?

2 Of course the evidence for some ideas becomes so overwhelming that in principle we treat some theories as certain knowledge, but in principle they remain provisional knowledge. And the history of science tells us that sometimes even the most well-established ideas (e.g., Newtonian physics as an absolutely precise description of dynamics; mass and energy as distinct and discrete) may need revision in time.

3 Since I began drafting this article, the webpage for the podcast has been updated with a correction: "in this talk Dr Finch says electrons in the synchrotron are accelerated to the speed of light. They actually go just under that speed – 99.99998% of it to be exact."

4 Perversion in the sense of the distortion of an original course

5 The term nebulae is today reserved for clouds of dust and gas seen in the night sky in different parts of our galaxy. Nebulae are less distinct than stars. Many of what were originally identified as nebulae are now considered to be other galaxies immense distances away from our own.