A topic in constructivism
So-called 'Radical' constructivism
[Read about 'Constructivism']
One 'version' of constructivism which has had a lot of attention (in science and mathematics education, certainly) is known as radical constructivism. Radical constructivism is a perspective that was developed in particular by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Some scientists are very suspicious of this type of constructivism as Glasersfeld considered we can never know an external reality, only our own personal construct of it – and each of our experienced 'realities' are different.
Glasersfeld did not deny an external objective reality (just that we could have certain knowledge of it), and indeed pointed out that our construals of the world were certainly constrained by reality (you may not think there is a brick wall in front of you, but if there is, then you will not be able to walk through it despite your beliefs).
So, although radical constructivism may seem to support 'relativism', to my mind it is aligned with much contemporary understanding of the nature of science. Scientists are building models of the world that they test, but can never have absolute certainty, even if experience can lead to them discarding hypotheses (and indeed theories) that fall short when tested. In the same way, we all are working with constructed accounts of our worlds which are just models (even if the human perceptual and cognitive system has evolved to give us models that function pretty well much of the time) and which may need to be refined or amended in the light of further experience. To reject that is to give up being a learner!
Is constructivism anti-science?
Constructivism is sometimes seem as inconsistent with science with its stress on objectivity (scientific findings should apply to everyone, and not just those with a particular perspective).
But this is to misunderstand both the nature of science and the kind of constructivism being applied in science education.
From the perspective of science: science seeks perfect objectivity – but that is an aim, and as humans are not perfectly neutral data-collecting machines the ideal is not always met. (Given that science does not always achieve the ideal of perfect objectivity, it is important to recognise the possibility of failure rather than pretend otherwise).
And the constructivists are not claiming idealism – that there is nothing out there apart from the ideas we come up with, just that our ideas of what is out there cannot perfectly reflect what is there ('reality' – the objective world external to our minds).
The physicist and philosopher of science Mario Bunge wrote:
"phenomenalist statements are not undistorted expressions of pure, preconceptual, unprejudiced experience, merely because human experience itself is never entirely free from the influence of expectations and opinions: to some extent we see what are ready to see and fail to see what we do not expect to see."
Note that Bunge does not say thsat we only see what we expert but that our perceptions are to some extent biased. That is the position of constructivists exploring the learning of science.
Work cited:
- Bunge, M. (1998). Philosophy of Science. Volume 1: From problem to theory. Routledge. (1967)
