Induction

A topic in research methodology

Induction is a label given to the logical process whereby new concepts or conclusions arise from the inspection of evidence (compared with a deductive approach where evidence is collected to test an existing chain of logic). Discovery approaches to research rely on inductive processes, whereas confirmatory forms of research are based on deductive logic.

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"The theorist's method involves his using as his foundation general postulates or 'principles' from which he can deduce conclusions. His work thus falls into two parts. He must first discover his principles and then draw the conclusions which follow from them. …. The first of these tasks, namely, that of establishing the principles which are to serve as the starting point of his deduction…[offers] no method capable of being learned and systematically applied so that it leads to the goal. The scientist has to worm these general principles out of nature by perceiving in comprehensive complexes of empirical facts certain general features which permit of precise formulation."

Albert Einstein, 1914

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Separating data collection and conceptualisation

Induction was the basis of the method of scence proposed by Francis Bacon, which in principle deferred all abstract concpetualisation until after one had collected and organised the data ready for analysis. This requires the scientist to know which relevant data need to be collected, and how to organise them for analysis, without undertaking any abstract conceptualisation – an unrealistic ideal:

"Bacon was convinced that the scientist must begin by collecting his [sic] material from the observations of sense alone and without any theoretical preparation or admixture of abstract ideas. Only when the task of assembling the data has been completed does the work of examining them begin. Individual cases must be compared, and positive and negative instances weighed against one another, until finally a single rule covering a definite set of phenomena has been found. Here two entirely separate intellectual operations come into play. The facts themselves constitute a self-contained whole, which only later is subjected to theoretical treatment and interpretation."

Cassirer, 1950)

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Induction as a logically incokplete process

In natural science, it is usual to assume that we can generalise from observations we have made in the past to future instances. But it has long been known that this is indeed making an assumption:

"As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognisance: But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist."

David Hume, 1777

The process of coming to form generalisation by induction is recognised to be a logically incomplete process (especially since Karl Popper published The Logic of Scientific Discovery). No sampling of a population and observing a particular outcome offers logical grounds for assuming the outcome must always occur. Our conceptualisations of data are never exhaustive – it is always possible for other interpretations to put upon our data.

A key issue with induction is the origin of the new concepts we form to make sense of data – which just seem to emerge in our thinking, i.e., to be the outcomes of creative mental processes. Researchers need to employ some form of post-inductive resonance to check the extent to which such insights effectively fit their data. In grounded theory methodology, a process referred to as constant comparison is employed for this purpose.

Rescher suggests that:

"Induction is……an instrument for question-resolution in the face of imperfect information. It is a tool for use by finite intelligences, capable of yielding not the best possible answer (in some rarified sense of this term), but the best available answer, the best we can manage to secure in the existing conditions in which we do and must conduct our epistemic labors."

Rescher, 1980: 7

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Sources cited:

• Cassirer, Ernst (1950) The Problem of Knowledge. Philosophy, science, & history since Hegel. (Translat. William H. Woglom & Charles W. Hendel) New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
• Einstein, Albert (1914), Principles of theoretical physics. In Ideas and Opinions (1994), New York: The Modern Library.
• Hume, D. (1777/2007) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited and with an Introduction and Notes by Peter Millican. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Popper, K. R. (1934/1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
• Rescher, N. (1980). Induction: An essay on the justification of inductive reasoning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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