Tag: surface tension

Surface tension is due to everybody trying to get into the water

Surely you are joking, Prof. Feynman? 1

Keith S. Taber

Photo of Richard Feynman, taken in 1984 © Tamiko Thiel (accessed from Wikipedia and shared under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported)

The late, great, Richard Feynman

Richard Feynman was special. Any one who wins the Nobel prize has to be pretty special, but physics laureate Feynman was even more remarkable as he was an exceptionally high achieving research physicist also known for his…teaching. No one gets a Nobel for being a good teacher, and it is often considered in Academia that teaching (that is, if one tries to give teaching the time and energy required to do it well – as students deserve) distracts from research to such an extent that it is rare to excel in both.

Feynman had something a lot of scientists do not not: great charisma. (That is no insult to fellow scientists – most plumbers and greengrocers and bus drivers and accountants and hairdressers do not – that is what makes it notable). He might be considered the Albert Einstein of the second half of the twentieth century, and because of that timescale we are lucky to have quality recordings of him talking and teaching in a way that could not have happened with previous generations. (A great shame in many cases: if perhaps a blessing with some – Isaac Newton's lectures were apparently avoided by most of his own students.)

Like many people, I find Feynman bewitching – he had a sparkle about him – almost a permanent mischievous twinkle in the eye – and an ability to somehow express the excitement of science (of working out why things are as they are) whilst being able to talk in ways that could be understood by people that lacked his expertise. That is perhaps one trait of a great teacher – being able to talk at the level of the audience, despite personally understanding at a higher, more complex and subtle, level.

That is by way of preamble – as I want to consider an explanation Feynman once offered of surface tension.

Screenshot of Richard Feynman explaining why water forms into drops.

Why does it rain in drops?

The extract I am discussing is taken from a 1983 BBC series of short episodes in a series called 'Fun to Imagine'. Although, at the time of writing, the episodes are "not currently available" from the BBC site, there is a compilation on YouTube. One of the topics Feynman discusses is the origin of surface tension – although he only introduces the technical term after explaining the phenomenon that water forms into droplets,

"you see a little drop of water, a tiny drop
And the atoms [sic, molecules] attract each other, they like to be next to each other
They want as many partners as they can get
Now the guys that are at the surface have only partners on one side
here, in the air on the other side, so they're trying to get in
And you can imagine…this teeming people, all moving very fast
all trying to have as many partners as possible and the guys at the edge are very unhappy and nervous and they keep pounding in
trying to get in, and that makes it a tight ball instead of a flat
and that's what, you know, surface tension
When you realise when you see how sometimes a water drop sits like this on a table then you start to imagine why it's like that
because everybody is trying to get into the water"

Richard Feynman speaking in 1983

Is this a good explanation?

Well, we might suggest Feynman makes a schoolchild error – water is not an atomic substance, but molecular. It does not contain discrete atoms, so he should be referring to the molecules attracting each other. But I do not think this is an error in the sense that Feynman was mistaken, simply that although the distinction is of great importance in chemistry, physicists sometimes use the term 'atom' generically to refer to the individual particles in a gas, for example. That might be unhelpful to a secondary school student studying for examinations, but if Feynman thought of his television audience for the recording as lay people, the general public, then perhaps the distinction between atoms (arguably a more familiar term in everyday discourse) and molecules would be considered an unhelpful detail? I am certainly prepared to give him that. I think it was the wrong choice, but not that Feynman was in error.

But what about the overall argument here. The 'atoms' want to have partners all around them 2 so they try to get inside the volume of the liquid. The overall effect of everyone, including these guys at the edge, trying to get inside the water is that it forms a sphere-like shape: "a tight ball instead of [something more] flat". Is that a convincing explanation – and is it a valid one?

What makes for a good explanation?

If anything is central to both science and science teaching, it is explanation.

"Explanation would seem to be central to the essence of science. A naïve view might claim that science discovers knowledge about the World, although it might be more accurate to suggest that science creates knowledge through the development of theories. The theories are used in turn to understand, predict and sometimes control the world, and in these activities, scientific explanations play the key role. We might consider theories and models to be the resources of science, but explanations to be the active processes through which theory is applied to contexts of interest…

An explanation is an answer to a 'why' question: but that in itself neither makes for a good explanation, nor for a scientific one. There is no simple answer to what does count as a good explanation, in science or elsewhere. Explanations have audiences, and to some extent, a good explanation is one that satisfied its audience – in other words it meets the explainee's purpose in seeking an explanation. Additionally, it has been known since at least Aristotle's time that we can talk of different kinds of causes, which suggests that many 'why questions' might have different types of acceptable responses, depending on the type of cause being sought."

Taber, 2007, p.159 [Download the chapter]

That passage is taken from a chapter where I described some activities used with secondary school students to help teach them about the nature of scientific explanation. (Read about the classroom activities here.) In that context, working with learners who were about 14 years of age, students were told that a good scientific explanation would be logical, and would draw upon scientific theory,

"pupils were told that scientific explanations needed to take into account logic and theory, i.e., that the explanation needs to be rational, and the explanation needs to draw upon accepted scientific ideas. As the notion of 'theory' is itself known to be difficult for students, they were also told that scientific theories are ideas about the world which are well supported by evidence; are internally consistent; and which usually fit with other accepted theories."

Taber, 2007, p.159 [Download the chapter]

Feynman's explanation is logical (if incomplete)

In that regard, Feynman's explanation can be considered logical, even if it omits (i.e., he takes as assumed) an important step* that is needed to explain the (approximately) spherical shape of the water drop.

If water quanticles (let's leave aside whether they are atoms or molecules) want to have many partners 2, and so try to get inside the volume, then we can understand* that the water drop will tend to the smallest surface area possible, so as few quanticles end up at the surface (with the tenuous air, rather than congregating water partners, on one side) where they will be nervous, and as many quanticles as possible are in the interior of the drop where they will be happy.

* The missing step is to state that a spherical drop will have a smaller surface area than any other shape with the same volume and so fewest quanticles at the surface. Perhaps Feynman assumed everyone would know/see that. Probably there is no such thing as a totally complete explanation.

So, is this a good explanation?

Explanations can have different purposes. Scientific explanations allow us to make effective predictions (and so often to control situations – the application of science through technology). But, in everyday life, explanations have a more subjective purpose ("explanations have audiences, and to some extent, a good explanation is one that satisfied its audience").

If, as a result of hearing Feynman's explanation, the viewers of the BBC televison programme

  • felt they now understood why sphere-like drops of water form, and
  • considered they had made sense of some science, and so
  • appreciated the value of science in explaining everyday phenomena,

then perhaps the explanation achieved its purpose?

Was Feynman's explanation scientific?

Of course, if I am being my usual pedantic self, I could point out that although Feynman's explanation was logical, that does not make it scientific unless it also drew upon accepted scientific principles. It was logical because the explicandum (what was to be explained – here, the drop shape) followed from the premise (i.e., if water quanticles want to have many partners, and act accordingly, then…)

But, in science, quanticles are not understood as sentient actors, but as inanimate entities that are not (and cannot be) aware of their situation and cannot act deliberately to work towards personal goals. Therefore, no matter how convincing someone may have found this explanation, it does not qualify as a scientific explanation as it is not based on accepted scientific principles (…or at least, not directly).

An anthropomorphic explanation

Feynman's explanation uses anthropomorphism, which from a scientific perspective makes it a pseudo-explanation. A pseudo-explanation takes the form of an explanation in that it is presented as if an answer to a why question, but does meet the requirements for a formal explanation (e.g., it does "not logically fit the phenomenon to be explained into a wider conceptual scheme", Taber & Watts, 2000.)

There are various kinds of pseudo-explanations such as tautology (circular explanations that rely on the conclusions as premises) and simply offering a label for the explicandum (e.g., water absorbs a lot of heat for a small change in its temperature because it has a high heat capacity – this is a kind of disguised tautology, as a 'high heat capacity' is a way of characterising something that absorbs a lot of heat for a small change in its temperature).

Read about pseudo-explanations

Anthropomorphism explains by assuming that the entities involved can be considered to be like people, and, so, to be sentient, have feelings and opinions and preferences, and be able to plan and carry out actions that are intended to being about desired consequences.

It relies on an analogy that may not be appropriate:

  • if people were in a situation like this, they are likely to behave in a certain way
  • if we treat these entities as if they were people then we might expect them to behave as people would, therefore…

It is an open question to what extent we can assume animals (chimpanzees, dogs, birds, etc.) can be considered to share aspects of human-like experiences, emotions, thoughts, etcetera. Perhaps it is reasonable to suggest a dog can be sad or a chimp can be jealous. It may not be stretching credibility to suggest that members of some species of animals want to be in large groups, like to be in large groups, and perhaps may even get nervous when isolated? However, it stretches credibility when we are told that viruses are clever or that a bacterium can be happy.

And, there is a pretty strong scientific consensus that at the level of individual molecules there is no possibility of emotions, opinions, desires, thoughts, or deliberate actions. Atoms do not want to fill their electron shells, and genes cannot be selfish, except in a figurative sense.

Read about anthropomorphism

So, in order to accept Feynman's explanation as valid, we would have to assume that the quanticles in water, water molecules,

  • like to be next to each other
  • want as many partners as they can get 2
  • can be unhappy and nervous
  • try to have as many partners as possible 2
  • try to get into the inside of the volume

So, to find this explanation convincing, we have to accept (contrary to science) that something like a water molecule is able to

  1. have desires and preferences,
  2. be aware of the extent to which is current situation matches its preferences, and,
  3. deliberately act to bring about desired outcomes

[Feynman does not explicitly state that the quanticles know about their situation (point 2), but clearly this is implied as otherwise they would have no reason to be nervous and unhappy, nor to act to bring about change.]

These requirements are clearly not met. A being with a central nervous system as complex as a human can meet these requirements, but there is no conceivable mechanism by which molecules can be considered sentient, or to be deliberate agents in the world.

So, even if Feynman's explanation of surface tension satisfies viewers of the recording (i.e., is is subjectively an effective explanation) it fails as an objective, scientific, explanation. Feynman may indeed have been a 'genius' (Gleick, 1994), and a great physicist, but his explanation here is invalid and simply fails as good science.

Now a reader may suspect I have gone after a 'straw man' target here. Surely, Feynman was speaking figuratively, and not literally. Of course he was, but figurative language cannot support a logical explanation, except through an analogy we suspect to hold.

Consider the following hypothetical claim and two possible consequences if the claim was true

ClaimConsequence 1Consequence 2
"I managed to get tickets for Toyah and Fripp's sold out concert in Bury St Edmunds, and these tickets are gold dust.""I could sell these tickets at quite a mark up""I could put a sample of these tickets in a mass spectrometer and would find they had an atomic mass of 197."

If the claim was literally true, then consequence 2 would follow. But of course, it is meant as a figurative claim, where 'gold dust' is a metaphor for something of high value because it is rare. So, actually consequence 1 might follow, but not consequence 2.

In the same way, if water particles do not have likes, and do not try to do things, Fenyman's argument seems to fall apart…

A teaching model?

Now I would not presume to know better than Richard Feynman, and I am pretty sure (i.e., about as certain as I can be of anything) that Feynman would not have fallen into the mistake of thinking that atoms or molecules actually act like humans and want things, or try to do things. He surely knew this was not a scientific explanation, but he clearly thought this was a useful way of explaining (to his audience) why water forms into a drop.

Now, I suggested above that Feynman's narrative account of the origin of surface tension "is not based on accepted scientific principles (…or at least, not directly)". But near the outset of this account Feynman states that the water particles "attract each other":

"the [molecules] attract each other, they like to be next to each other"

Feynman was not only a researcher, but a teacher, and teachers use teaching models. I think this is what Feynman is doing here:

"[according to science] the [molecules] attract each other [and we can think of this as if] they like to be next to each other"

Affinity in the sense of human experience is used as a kind of analogy for the affinity between water molecules (which leads to hydrogen bonding and dipole-dipole interactions). Once we model inter-molecular forces as being like attractions between people, we can extend the analogy in terms of how people feel when they do not get what they want, and how they respond by acting in ways that they hope will get them what they want.

Looked at this way, Feynman is doing something that good teachers often do when they judge a scientific model is too abstract, sophisticated, complex, subtle, for their audience; they simplify by substituting a teaching model which represents the scientific model in terms more familiar and accessible to the learners.

Read about making the unfamiliar familiar

From this perspective, Feynman's explanation may not have been a valid scientific explanation, but we might ask if it was an effective intermediate explanation set out in terms of a teaching model. That is, perhaps Feynman's explanation may have satisfied viewers, and also potentially acted as a possible foundation for building up to a more technical, scientifically acceptable explanation.

Teachers and other science communicators often use anthropomorphism as a way of offering accounts of complex scientific topics that will appeal and make sense to learners of a public audience.

Read about anthropomorphism in accounts of science

This can be effective to the extent that it engages learners, leaves the audience with a subjective sense of making sense of the science, and provides accounts that are often remembered later.

Of course that is not so helpful if the audience is studying a science course, and think they have learnt an account which will get them credit in formal examinations! I know from my own teaching career that learners often find anthropomorphic explanations readily come to mind, even when then they have been taught more technical accounts they are expected to apply when assessed.

In public science communication, then, anthropomorphic accounts may be valuable in offering people some sense of the science. But in formal education we need to be careful as even if anthropomorphism offers a useful way of getting learners familiar with some abstract topic (what might be called 'weak' anthropomorphism: Taber & Watts, 1996), we need to avoid them learning and committing to that metaphoric 'social' account thinking it is a valid scientific account ('strong' anthropomorphism).

Mapping Feynman's explanation

If we see Feynman as offering an analogy as a teaching model then we might seek to 'translate' his terms into more scientific concepts. He tells us that attraction is 'liking', and we can perhaps think of 'wanting' and being 'nervous' as indicating a higher (excited) energy state, 'pounding' as being subject to unbalanced forces, and 'trying to get in' as tending to evolving toward a lower energy configuration. At least, someone who already understood the scientific account could suggest such mappings. It seems unlikely any one who did not appreciate the science already could interpret it that way without a knowing and careful guide.

And like all anthropomorphic explanations, it 'suffers' from the very quality that it offers a narrative which is likely to be more easily understood, better related to, and more readily recalled, than the scientific account. This is why I have very mixed feelings about the use of anthropomorphism in formal science teaching, as even when it (a) does a great job of engaging learners and offering them some level of understanding, this may be at the cost of (b) offering an account which many students will find it hard to later let go of and progress beyond.

Screenshot of Richard Feynman explaining why water forms into drops.

As a good teacher, Feynman would know to pitch his teaching for particular audiences depending on their likely level of background knowledge. The explanation discussed here was not how Feynman taught about surface tension in his undergraduate classes at the California Institute of Technology (Feynman, Leighton & Sands, 1963). We can imagine that had he told students at Caltech that water formed into spherical drops because all the molecular guys are trying to get into the water, he might indeed had heard the retort: Surely you are joking, Prof. Feynman? 1

Work cited:

Notes:

1 My subtitle is a reference to the book 'Surely you're Joking Mr Feynman: Adventures of a Curious Character' in which Feynman tells anecdotes from his life.

2 Water was perhaps a poor example to choose as there is extensive hydrogen bonding in liquid water,

"I suspect even some experienced chemists may underestimate the extent of hydrogen bonding in water. According to one source…, in liquid water at the freezing point, the typical water molecule is at any time bonded by three or four hydrogen bonds – compared with the four bonds in the solid ice structure."

Taber, 2020, p.98

So, in Feynman's analogy, a water molecules does not become happy (lower energy state) when it is surrounded by as many other water molecules as possible, but when it is aligned with 3 or 4 other molecules to hydrogen bond, if only transiently. Without the hydrogen bonding, the drop would still be approximately spherical, but it would be smaller and denser as the molecules could get even closer together, but it would evaporate away more readily.

What the jet tried to do next…

Anthropomorphising surface tension

Keith S. Taber

it seems good training for a scientist to always read accounts of science with a critical filter primed to notice figurative language and to check that the communication can be understood in a non-metaphorical way

When water is poured from a bottle or other container the stream of liquid can take up complex shapes. In particular, it has long been noted how the stream can appear to have the shape of a chain or string of beads, with the flow seeming to be wider in some places that others.

A stream of poured water does not form a perfect cylinder – something that physics should be able to explain.

(Image by tookapic from Pixabay)

This is just the kind of thing that physicists think they should be able to explain…using physics. An article in Physics World (Jarman, 2022) reports some recent work on just this outstanding problem,

"If you pour water out of a bottle, the liquid stream will often adopt a chain-like structure….At the heart of the effect is the non-cylindrical profile of the jet as it emerges. To minimize surface tension, the jet tries to become a cylinder, but this motion overshoots and results in an oscillation in the profile shape."

Article in Physics World

What intrigued me here was the choice of phrasing: "To minimize surface tension, the jet tries to become a cylinder…". This language could be considered to reflect teleology, and even anthropomorphism.

Teleology?

Teleological explanations are those that explain something in terms of some kind of endpoint. Something happens in order to bring about some specific state of affairs. The sun shines to allow us to find our way. Plants produce oxygen so we can breathe. That is, there is seen to be purpose in nature, something that is characteristic of mythical and supernatural thinking. In science, teleological explanations are strictly considered a kind of pseudo-explanation – something that has the form of an explanation, but does not really explain anything. Sometimes we find apparently teleological explanations in science because they are being used as a kind of shorthand. For example, if we know that science suggests entropy always increases in processes, we might interpret a scientist's comment that something happens 'in order to increase entropy' to be a loose (or lazy) way of saying that some suggested mechanism or action is considered likely because it is consistent with the assumption that entropy will increase.

Read about pseudo-explanations

Read about teleology in science

Here it is suggested that the odd shape is formed in order "to" minimise surface tension. Scientists have observed that many phenomena (such as rain forming roundish drops) can be explained in terms that surface tension tends to be minimised (cf. entropy tends to increase, objects tend to roll down hills, people tend to get older). But the language here might suggest minimising surface tension is an end that nature seeks – that would be a teleological explanation.

Although perhaps this is not simple teleology, as it is not that the water forms into the shape it does to minimise surface tension, but something more nuanced is going on – the jet of water is actively trying, but not quite managing, to minimise surface tension.

anthropo… (to do with humans, as in anthropology)
…morphism (to do with form, as in morphology, amorphous)

…and anthropomorphism?

Anthropomorphic language refers to non-human entities as if they have human experiences, perceptions, and motivations. Both non-living things and non-human organisms may be subjects of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism may be used deliberately as a kind of metaphorical language that will help the audience appreciate what is being described because of its similarly to some familiar human experience. In science teaching, and in public communication of science, anthropomorphic language may often be used in this way, giving technical accounts the flavour of a persuasive narrative that people will readily engage with. Anthropomorphism may therefore be useful in 'making the unfamiliar familiar', but sometimes the metaphorical nature of the language may not be recognised, and the listener/reader may think that the anthropomorphic description is meant to be taken at face value. This 'strong anthropomorphism' may be a source of alternative conceptions ('misconceptions') of science.

Read about anthropomorphism

So, in our present case, we are told that "the "the jet tries to become a cylinder". This is anthropomorphic, as to try to do something means having a goal in mind and deliberately behaving in a way that it is believed, expected, or – at least – hoped, will lead to that goal. Human beings can try to achieve things. We can perceive our environment, have goals, conceptualise possibilities and means to reach them, and put in practice an intention.

Whether, and, if so, which, animals can try to do things rather than simply following evolved instincts is a debated issue.

  • Does a dog try to please its human companion by bringing the newspaper?
  • Does the dolphin try to earn a fish by jumping through a hoop? Perhaps.
  • Does the salmon try to get to a suitable spawning site ('ground', sic) by swimming upstream?
  • Does the spider try to make a symmetrical web?
  • Does the bee try to collect nectar by visiting flowers. Probably not.
  • Does she try to fertiliser those flowers with pollen to ensure there will be flowers for her to visit in future seasons? Almost certainly not!
Jets of water?

Do jets of water think that being cylindrical is desirable (perhaps because they recognise minimal surface tension as an inherent good?) , and so make efforts to bring this about? Clearly not. So, they do not try to do this. They do not try to do anything. They are not the kind of entities that can try.

So, this language is metaphorical. The reader is meant to read that "the jet tries to become a cylinder" to mean something other than "the jet tries to become a cylinder". Now, often figures of speech are used in science communication because the ideas being communicated are abstract and complex, and metaphorical language that describes the science in more familiar terms makes the text more accessible and increases engagement by the audience/readership.

A question here then, is what "the jet tries to become a cylinder" communicates that was more likely to be inaccessible to the reader. Physics World is the house magazine of the Institute of Physics, which means it is sent to all it members working across all areas of physics. So a broad readership, though largely a readership of physicists.

Tracing the stream back to the source

Another question that occurred to me was whether the reporter (Jarman) was simply reporting the original researchers' (Jordan, Ribe, Deblais and Bonn) ways of communicating their work. That report was in an academic journal, Physical Review Fluids, where formal, technical language would be expected. So, I looked up the paper, to see how the work was described there.

Under a heading of 'phenomenology', Jordan and colleagues explain

"Chain oscillations are most readily observed when the viscosities of the jet and the ambient fluid are low and the interface has a high surface tension. Water jets in air satisfy these criteria, and so it is no surprise that chain oscillations occur in many everyday situations. Deformation and vibration of a jet are capillary phenomena in which surface tension acts to reduce the jet's surface area. If the cross section is not circular, its highly curved portions are pulled inward and its weakly curved portions pushed outward relative to a circular section with the same area. But due to inertia the movement overshoots, with the result that the long and short axes of the section are interchanged. The shape of the section therefore evolves as it moves along the axis of the jet, producing a steady liquid chain when observed in the laboratory frame…"

Jordan, Ribe, Deblais & Bonn, 2022

"The shape of the section therefore evolves as it moves along the axis of the jet, producing a steady liquid chain when observed"

(Image by Kevin Phillips from Pixabay)

(This seemed to be a somewhat different meaning of 'phenomenology' to that sometimes used in science education or social science more generally. Phenomenology looks to explore how people directly experience and perceive the world. Jordan and colleagues include here a good deal of re-conceptualisation and interpretation of what is directly observed. 1 )

The effect Jordan and colleagues describe seems analogous to how a pendulum bob that is released and so accelerated (by gravity) towards the point directly beneath its support (where gravitational potential is minimised) acquires sufficient momentum to overshoot, and swing upwards, beginning an oscillatory motion. Something similar is seen in an ammeter where the needle often overshoots, and initially oscillates around the value of a steady current reading (unless the spring is 'critically damped'). The effect is also made use on in striking a tuning fork.

No need to try

There is no mention here of 'trying', so no clear anthropomorphism. So, this was a gloss added in the report in Physics World, perhaps because anthropomorphic narratives are especially engaging and readily accepted by audiences; perhaps because the reporter needed to rephrase so as not to borrow too much of the original text, or perhaps as part of preparing brief copy to an editorially assigned word length. Or, perhaps Sam Jarman was not even conscious of the anthropomorphism being used, as this seems such a natural way to communicate. 2

Surface tension acting up

Did the original authors avoid teleology? They do write about how "surface tension acts to reduce the jet's surface area?" This could be read as teleological – as there seems to be a purpose or goal in the 'action', even if it is not here presented as a premeditated action. Could any suggestions of such a purpose be avoided?

One response might be that, yes, a physicist might suggest the 'true' description is a mathematical formula (and there are plenty of formulae in Jordan et al's paper) and that a verbal description is necessarily the translation of an objective description into an inherently figurative medium (natural language).

And, of course, this is not some special case. We might read that gravity acts to pull something to the ground or air resistance acts to slow a projectile down and so forth. 'To' may just imply a cause of an outcome, not a purpose.

I think a rewording along the lines "the action of the surface tension reduces the jet's surface area"conveys the same meaning, but is more of a neutral description of a process, avoiding any suggestion that there is a purpose involved.

Reading and interpreting

But does this matter? In teaching young people such as school children, there is evidence that some figurative language that is anthropomorphic or teleological may be understood in those terms, and student thinking may later reflect this. Part of science education is offering learners an insight into how science does seek to (oh, science personified: sorry, scientists seek to) describe in neutral terms and not to rely on nature having inherent goals, or comprising of the actions of sentient and deliberate agents.

The readership of Physics World is however a professional audience of members of the community of inducted physicists who are well aware that, actually, surface tension does not try to do anything; and that minimising surface tension is a common observed pattern, not something set out as a target for physical systems to aim for. These physicists are unlikely to be led astray by the engaging prose of Sam Jarman and will fully appreciate the intended meaning.

That said, there is an intimate bidirectional relationship between our thinking and our speech – our speech reflects our thought pattens, but our language also channels our thinking. So, it seems good training for a scientist to always read accounts of science with a critical filter primed to notice figurative language and to check that the communication can be understood in a non-metaphorical way. That includes checking that our understanding of what we have read is in keeping with scientific commitments to exclude explanations that are framed in terms of nature's end goals, or the deliberate agency of non-sentient 'actors'.

  • Jarman, S. (2022). Flowing liquid 'chains' are best described by Niels Bohr, not Lord Rayleigh. Physics World, 35(12).
  • Jordan, D. T. A., Ribe, N. M., Deblais, A., & Bonn, D. (2022). Chain oscillations in liquid jets. Physical Review Fluids, 7(10), 104001. doi:10.1103/PhysRevFluids.7.104001
Notes

1 However, none of us are able to be completely naive observers of the world. As William James long ago pointed out, the un-mediated sensory experience of a newborn is a chaos of noise and shapes and colours and so on. Even recognising another person or the presence of a table is an act of interpretation that we learn.

So, experts in a field do see things others do not. A field palaeontologist sees a fossil fragment where the rest of us see undifferentiated dirt and stones. The biochemist sees a steroid structure in a patterns of lines. The football pundit sees a 4-4-2 formation where the occasional viewers just sees people running around. The experienced poker player sees a 'tell' that others would not notice. The professional musician hears a passage in E minor, when most of us just hear a tune.

2 This kind of language reflects a way of thinking and talking often called 'the natural attitude'. Science can be seen in part as a deliberate move to look beyond the common-sense world of the natural attitude to problematise phenomena that might be readily taken as given.

We may get used to, and simply accept, that ice is cold, fire burns, the Lord/King makes decisions and owns the land (and people!), rivers flow, things fall down, the heretic must die, the sun moves across the sky, etc. – and probably most people did for much of human history – where the critical (scientific) attitude is to always ask 'why?'