"But even after someone is infected, the host actually mounts, for all these [respiratory] viruses, a really dramatic immune and inflammatory response. So it sort of lights a fire. And even when the virus stops replicating, you know that fire continues to burn, and in a lot of cases that's what lands people in the hospital. And so you want to prevent the virus from igniting that fire, that is what really ends up causing a huge amount of damage to the patient. …
the greatest benefit [of the antiviral drug being tested] is in the outpatient setting before that fire gets ignited."
Science communicators, such as teachers, but also scientists and journalists presenting science in the public media, often use techniques to 'make the unfamiliar familiar', to get across abstract or difficult ideas in ways that their audience can relate to.
These techniques can include analogies, metaphors and similes. Here Dr Hazuda used an analogy between the damage to tissue that can occur in disease, and the damage a fire can do. In particular, she was suggesting that the virus may be seen as like something which ignites a fire (such as a match or a spark) but which is not needed to keep the fire going once it had taken hold.
She introduced this idea by suggesting that the virus "sort of lights a fire". This can be considered a simile, which is a figure of speech which is a kind of explicit comparison where one thing is said to be like or similar to another.2 Dr Hazuda did not suggest that the virus actually lights a fire, but rather it has an effect which can be considered somewhat like ('sort of') igniting a fire.
"We didn't start the fire It was always burning, since the world's been turning We didn't start the fire No, we didn't light it, but we tried to fight it"
Billy Joel
Viruses triggering long term disease
The symptoms we experience when ill can be the results of our immune system reacting to illness, rather than the direct effect of the disease causing agent. That does not mean the disease itself would not harm us (infectious agents may be destroying cells which would not be obvious until extensive damage was done), but that in some conditions what we notice – perhaps sneezing, coughing, a raised temperature – is due to the immune response.
The immediate context of the Science in Actioninterview was the current COVID-19 pandemic caused by infection with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. However, the idea that a viral infection may trigger ('ignite') a longer term immune response (the 'fire') is not new with COVID. The syndrome sometimes known as chronic fatigue syndrome has unknown cause(s), but viruses are among the suspects. Viruses have been suspected as being a possible trigger (if perhaps in combination with other factors) in a range of autoimmune conditions. In autoimmune conditions the mechanisms that usually protect a person from infectious agents such as (some) bacteria and viruses attack and destroy the person's own cells leading to inflammation and potentially serious tissue damage.
People might commonly say that the immune system is 'meant' or 'intended' to protect us from diseases and that it sometimes 'goes wrong' leading to autoimmune disease – but strictly this is not a scientific way of thinking. The immune system has no purpose as such (this would be 'teleological' thinking), but has just evolved in ways such that it has on balance increased fitness.
From that perspective, it might not seem so strange that our immune systems are sometimes insufficient to protect us from harm, and yet can also sometimes be over-sensitive and start doing damage – as that surely is what we might expect if evolution has (through natural selection) led to a system which has tendedon the whole to be protective.
The admirable HLA-B27?
"HLA B27 plays an admirable, perhaps outstanding role in the immune response to viruses, however, it is also directly involved in the pathogenesis of the spondyloarthropathies"
Bowness, 2002: 866
My late wife Philippa was diagnosed with a complex autoimmune condition – she was told that she had atypical Wegener's granulomatosis (a disease now usually called Granulomatosis with polyangiitis2), a form of vasculitis (a disease leading to inflammation in the blood vessels), and that she might have been genetically susceptible to autoimmune diseases because she produced a particular type of human leukocyte antigen, HLA-B27. HLA is an important component of human immune systems, but the precise antigens a person produces varies, depending on their genes (just as we all have blood but people can be assigned into different blood groups). It was also suggested to her that an otherwise minor infection may have acted as a trigger in setting off the autoimmune problems.
Medicine today has some effective agents such as steroids that help 'dampen down' the 'fires' that damage tissues in autoimmune diseases. But these conditions can be very serious. Fifty years ago, most people found to have Wegener's granulomatosis were dead from that damage within a year of their diagnosis.
HLA-B27 is only found in a minority of people in most populations and is associated with a higher prevalence of certain immune conditions such as ankylosing spondylitis (an inflammatory condition especially affecting the spine), inflammatory bowel disease, and some forms of arthritis. It might seem odd that evolution has not led to the elimination of HGLA-B27 if it is associated with serious medical conditions. Yet, again, it may be that something which can make people prone to some conditions may also be better at protecting them from others.
People with HLA-B27 may be better at mounting an effective immune response to some viral infections (the fire is more readily ignited, we might say) and this might be enough of an advantage to balance its unfortunate role in autoimmune conditions. Over human history, HLA-B27 might have protected a great many people from dangerous infections, if also being responsible for a smaller number becoming very ill.
"HLA-B27 appears to excel at its natural function of binding and presenting viral peptide epitopes to cytotoxic T cells. We have suggested that HLA-B27 may, however, act as a 'double-edged sword'. Thus, certain features of its peptide binding ability or cell biology (perhaps those favouring excellent antiviral responses) might also lead to autoimmunity."
McMichael & Bowness, 2002: S157
That is, what makes this immune component so good at attacking certain viruses (as if the immune system had been doused in petrol so that the slightest spark might initiate a response) may also be responsible for its association with autoimmune diseases. HLA-B27 may (metaphorically) be the can of petrol that means that a viral spark starts not just a fire, but a conflagration.
1: "the first oral, direct-acting antiviral shown to be highly effective at reducing nasopharyngeal SARS-CoV-2 infectious virus" according to a preprint reported at medRχiv). A preprint is a paper written to report scientific research but NOT yet tested through peer review and formally published, and so treated as reporting more provisional and uncertain findings than a peer-reviewed paper.
2 By comparison, a metaphor may be considered an implicit comparison presented as if an identity: e.g., the nucleus is the brain of the cell.
2. The disease was named after the German physician Friedrich Wegener who described the condition. After Wegener was identified as a Nazi and likely war criminal (suspected, but not convicted) it was decided to rename the disease.
When I was listening to the radio news I heard a clip of the Rt. Hon. Sajid Javid MP, the U.K. Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, talking about the ongoing response to the COVID pandemic:
Health Secretary Sajid Javid talking on 12th September
"Now that we are entering Autumn and Winter, something that COVID and other viruses, you know, usually like, the prime minister this week will be getting out our plans to manage COVID over the coming few months."
Sajid Javid
So, COVID and other viruses usually like Autumn and Winter (by implication, presumably, in comparison with Spring and Summer).
This got me wondering how we (or Sajid, at least) could know what the COVID virus (i.e., SARS-CoV-2 – severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) prefers – what the virus 'likes'. I noticed that Mr Javid offered a modal qualification to his claim: usually. It seemed 'COVID and other viruses' did not always like Autumn and Winter, but usually did.
Yet there was a potential ambiguity here depending how one parsed the claim. Was he suggesting that
[COVID and other viruses]
usually
like Autumn and Winter
or
COVID
[and other viruses usually]
like Autumn and Winter
This might have been clearer in a written text as either
COVID and other viruses usually like Autumn and Winter
or
COVID, and other viruses usually, like Autumn and Winter
The second option may seem a little awkward in its phrasing, 1 but then not all viral diseases are more common in the Winter months, and some are considered to be due to 'Summer viruses':
"Adenovirus, human bocavirus (HBoV), parainfluenza virus (PIV), human metapneumovirus (hMPV), and rhinovirus can be detected throughout the year (all-year viruses). Seasonal patterns of PIV are type specific. Epidemics of PIV type 1 (PIV1) and PIV type 3 (PIV3) peak in the fall [Autumn] and spring-summer, respectively. The prevalence of some non-rhinovirus enteroviruses increases in summer (summer viruses)"
Moriyama, Hugentobler & Iwasaki, 2020: 86
Just a couple of days later Mr Javid was being interviewed on the radio, and he made a more limited claim:
Health Secretary Sajid Javid talking on BBC Radio 4's 'Today' programme, 15th September
"…because we know Autumn and Winter, your COVID is going to like that time of year"
Sajid Javid
So, this claim was just about the COVID virus, not viruses more generally, and that we knowthat COVID is going to like Autumn and Winter. No ambiguity there. But how do we know?
Coming to knowledge
Historically there have been various ways of obtaining knowledge.
Divine revelation: where God reveals the knowledge to someone, perhaps through appearing to the chosen one in a dream.
Consulting an oracle, or a prophet or some other kind of seer.
Intuiting the truth by reflecting on the nature of things using the rational power of the human intellect.
My focus in this blog is related to science, and given that we are talking about public health policy in modern Britain, I would like to think Mr Javid was basing his claim on the latter option. Of course, even empirical methods depend upon some metaphysical assumptions. For example, if one assumes the cosmos has inbuilt connections one might look for evidence in terms of sympathies or correspondences. Perhaps, if the COVID virus was observed closely and looked like a snowflake, that could (in this mindset) be taken as a sign that it liked Winter.
A snowflake – or is it a virus particle? (Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay)
Sympathetic magic
This kind of correspondence, a connection indicated by appearance, was once widely accepted, so that a plant which was thought to resemble some part of the anatomy might be assumed to be an appropriate medicine for diseases or disorders associated with that part of the body.
This is a kind of magic, and might seem a 'primitive' belief to many people today, but such an idea was sensible enough in the context of a common set of underlying beliefs about the nature and purposes of the world, and the place and role of people in that world. One might expect that specific beliefs would soon die out if, for example, the plant shaped like an ear turned out to do nothing for ear ache. Yet, at a time when medical practitioners could offer little effective treatment, and being sent to a hospital was likely to reduce life expectancy, herbal remedies at least often (if not always) did no harm.
Moreover, many herbs do have medicinal properties, and something with a general systemic effect might work as topical medicine (i.e., when applied to a specific site of disease). Add to that, the human susceptibility to confirmation bias (taking more notice of, and giving more weight to, instances that meet our expectations than those which do not) and the placebo effect (where believing we are taking effective medication can sometimes in itself have beneficial effects) and the psychological support offered by spending time with an attentive practitioner with a good 'bedside' manner – and we can easily see how beliefs about treatments may survive limited definitive evidence of effectiveness.
The gold standard of experimental method
Of course, today, we have the means to test such medicines by taking a large representative sample of a population (of ear ache sufferers, or whatever), randomly dividing them into two groups, and using a double-blind (or should that be double-deaf) approach, treat them with the possible medicine or a placebo, without either the patient or the practitioner knowing who was getting which treatment. (The researchers have a way to know of course – or it would difficult to deduce anything from the results.) That is, the randomised control trial (RCT).
Now, I have been very critical of the notion that these kinds of randomised experimental designs should be automatically be seen as the preferred way of testing educational innovations (Taber, 2019) – but in situations where control of variables and 'blinding' is possible, and where randomisation can be applied to samples of well-defined populations, this does deserve to be considered the gold standard. (It is when the assumptions behind a research methodology do not apply that we should have reservations about using it as a strategy for enquiry.)
So can the RCT approach be used to find out if COVID has a preference for certain times of year? I guess this depends on our conceptual framework for the research (e.g., how do we understand what a 'like' actually is) and the theoretical perspective we adopt.
So, for example, behaviourists would suggest that it is not useful to investigate what is going on in someone's mind (perhaps some behaviorists do not even think the mind concept corresponds to anything real) so we should observe behaviours that allow us to make inferences. This has to be done with care. Someone who buys and eats lots of chocolate presumably likes chocolate, and someone who buys and listens to a lot of reggae probably likes reggae, but a person who cries regularly, or someone that stumbles around and has frequent falls, does not necessary like crying, or falling over, respectively.
A viral choice chamber
So, we might think that woodlice prefer damp conditions because we have put a large number of woodlice in choice chambers with different conditions (dry and light, dry and dark, damp and light, damp and dark) and found that there was a statistically significant excess of woodlice settling down in the damp sections of the chamber.
Of course, to infer preferences from behaviour – or even to use the term 'behaviour' – for some kinds of entity is questionable. (To think that woodlice make a choice based on what they 'like' might seem to assume a level of awareness that they perhaps lack?) In a cathode ray tube electrons subject to a magnetic field may be observed (indirectly!) to move to one side of the tube, just as woodlice might congregate in one chamber, but I am not sure I would describe this as electrons liking that part of the tube. I think it can be better explained with concepts such as electrical charge, fields, forces, and momentum.
It is difficult to see how we can do double blind trials to see which season a virus might like, as if the COVID virus really does like Winter, it must surely have a way of knowing when it is Winter (making blinding impossible). In any case, a choice chamber with different sections at different times of the year would require some kind of time portal installed between its sections.
Like electrons, but unlike woodlice, COVID viral particles do not have an active form of transport available to them. Rather, they tend to be sneezed and coughed around and then subject to the breeze, or deposited by contact with surfaces. So I am not sure that observing virus 'behaviour' helps here.
So perhaps a different methodology might be more sensible.
A viral opinion poll
A common approach to find out what people like would be a survey. Surveys can sometimes attract responses from large numbers of respondents, which may seem to give us confidence that they offer authentic accounts of widespread views. However, sample size is perhaps less important than sample representativeness. Imagine carrying out a survey of people's favourite football teams at a game at Stamford Bridge; or undertaking a survey of people's favourite bands as people queued to enter a King Crimson concert! The responses may [sic, almost certainly would] not fully reflect the wider population due to the likely bias in such samples. Would these surveys give reliable results which could be replicated if repeated at the Santiago Bernabeu or at a Marillion concert?
How do we know what 'COVID 'really likes? (Original Images by OpenClipart-Vectors and Gordon Johnson from Pixabay)
A representative sample of vairants?
This might cause problems with the COVID-19 virus (SARS-CoV-2). What counts as a member of the population – perhaps a viable virus particle? Can we even know how big the population actually is at the time of our survey? The virus is infecting new cells, leading to new virus particles being produced all the time, just as shed particles become non-viable all the time. So we have no reliable knowledge of population numbers.
Moreover, a survey needs a representative sample: do the numbers of people in a sample of a human population reflect the wider population in relevant terms (be that age, gender, level of educational qualifications, earnings, etc.)? There are viral variants leading to COVID-19 infection – and quite a few of them. That is, SARS-CoV-2 is a class with various subgroups. The variants replicate to different extents under particular conditions, and new variants appear from time to time.
So, the population profile is changing rapidly. In recent months in the UK nearly all infections where the variant has been determined are due to the variant VOC-21APR-02 (or B.1.617.2 or Delta) but many people will be infected asymptotically or with mild symptoms and not be tested, and so this likely does not mean that VOC-21APR-02 dominates the SARS-CoV-2 population as a whole to the extent it currently dominates in investigated cases. Assuming otherwise would be like gauging public opinion from the views of those particular people who make themselves salient by attending a protest, e.g.:
"Shock finding – 98% of the population would like to abolish the nuclear arsenal,
according to a [hypothetical] survey taken at the recent Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament march"
In any case, surveys are often fairly blunt instruments as they need to present objectively the same questions to all respondents, and elicit responses in a format that can be readily classified into a discrete number of categories. This is why many questionnaires use Likert type items:
Would you say you like Autumn and Winter:
1
2
3
4
5
Always
Nearly always
Usually
Sometimes
Never
Such 'objective' measures are often considered to avoid the subjective nature of some other types of research. It may seem that responses do not need to be interpreted – but of course this assumes that the researchers and all the respondents understand language the same way (what exactly counts as Autumn and Winter? What does 'like' mean? How is 'usually' understood – 60-80% of the time, or 51-90% of the time or…). We can usually (sic) safely assume that those with strong language competence will have somewhat similar understandings of terms, but we cannot know precisely what survey participants meant by their responses or to what extent they share a meaning for 'usually'.
There are so-called 'qualitative surveys' which eschew this kind of objectivity to get more in-depth engagement with participants. They will usually use interviews where the researcher can establish rapport with respondents and ask them about their thoughts and feelings, observe non-verbal signals such as facial expressions and gestures, and use follow-up questions… However, the greater insight into individuals comes at a cost of smaller samples as these kinds of methods are more resource-intensive.
But perhaps Mr Javid does not actually mean that COVID likes Autumn and Winter?
So, how did the Department of Health & Social Care, or the Health Secretary's scientific advisors, find out that COVID (or the COVID virus) likes Autumn and Winter? The virus does not think, or feel, and it does not have preferences in the way we do. It does not perceive hot or cold, and it does not have a sense of time passing, or of the seasons.2 COVID does not like or dislike anything.
Mr Javid needs to make himself clear to a broad public audience, so he has to avoid too much technical jargon. It is not easy to pitch a presentation for such an audience and be pithy, accurate, and engaging, but it is easy for someone (such as me) to be critical when not having to face this challenge. Cabinet ministers, unlike science teachers, cannot be expected to have skills in communicating complex and abstract scientific ideas in simplified and accessible forms that remain authentic to the science.
It is easy and perhaps convenient to use anthropomorphic language to talk about the virus, and this will likely make the topic seem accessible to listeners, but it is less clear what is actually meant by a virus liking a certain time of year. In teaching the use of anthropomorphic language can be engaging, but it can also come to stand in place of scientific understanding when anthropomorphic statements are simply accepted uncritically at face value. For example, if the science teacher suggests "the atom wants a full shell of electrons" then we should not be surprised that students may think this is a scientific explanation, and that atoms do want to fill their shells. (They do not of course. 3)
Image by Gordon Johnson from Pixabay
Of course Mr Javid's statements cannot be taken as a literal claim about what the virus likes – my point in this posting is to provoke the question of what this might be intended to mean? This is surely intended metaphorically (at least if Mr Javid had thought about his claim critically): perhaps that there is higher incidence of infection or serious illness caused by the COVID virus in the Winter. But by that logic, I guess turkeys really would vote for Christmas (or Thanksgiving) after all.
Typically, some viruses cause more infection in the Winter when people are more likely to mix indoors and when buildings and transport are not well ventilated (both factors being addressed in public health measures and advice in regard to COVID-19). Perhaps 'likes' here simply means that the conditions associated with a higher frequency/population of virus particles occur in Autumn and Winter?
A snowflake. The conditions suitable for a higher frequency of snowflakes are more common in Winter. So do snowflakes also 'like' Winter? (Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay)
However, this is some way from assigning 'likes' to the virus. After all, in evolutionary terms, a virus might 'prefer', so to speak, to only be transmitted asymptomatically, as it cannot be in the virus's 'interests', so to speak, to encourage a public health response that will lead to vaccines or measures to limit the mixing of people.
If COVID could like anything (and of course it cannot), I would suggest it would like to go 'under the radar' (another metaphor) and be endemic in a population that was not concerned about it (perhaps doing so little harm it is not even noticed, such that people do not change their behaviours). It would then only 'prefer' a Season to the extent that that time of year brings conditions which allow it to go about its life cycle without attracting attention – from Mr Javid or anyone else.
The health secretary was interviewed on 1st December
"…we have always known that when it gets darker, it gets colder, the virus likes that, the flu virus likes that and we should not forget that's still lurking around as well…"
Rt. Hon. Sajid Javid MP, the U.K. Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, interviewed on BBC Radio 4 Today programme, 1st December, 2021
Works cited:
Moriyama, M., Hugentobler, W. J., & Iwasaki, A. (2020). Seasonality of Respiratory Viral Infections. Annual Review of Virology, 7(1), 83-101. doi:10.1146/annurev-virology-012420-022445
1. It would also seem to be a generalisation based on the only two Winters that the COVID-19 virus had 'experienced'
2. Strictly I cannot know what it is like to be a virus particle. But a lot of well-established and strongly evidenced scientific principles would be challenged if a virus particle is sentient.
Is your shampoo of natural, unnatural, or supernatural origin?
Keith S. Taber
It seems that some of the ingredients of a well-known brand of hair care products are not of natural origin (Image by Stefan Keller from Pixabay)
A well know brand of hair products is being advertised on television with an explicit claim that the shampoo is 94% of natural origin. Clearly there is also an implicit claim here about the other 6%! This dubious claim does not seem to be a slip of the tongue, as similar references can be found in product details on line (including the examples below). The science teacher in me knew that it was this kind of nonsense which supports common misconceptions about 'natural' being inherently good, and there being a clear distinction between materials that are 'natural', and those that are not.
Shampoos from brands other than Herbal Essences are 100% of natural origin.
The other evening I was watching television, and there was a shampoo being advertised, and although I was not paying attention I thought I heard the claim that the shampoo contained products of 94% natural origin. Had I misheard – a quick 'rewind' suggested not.
My next assumption was that this was sloppy language being used by some advertising copywriter, and that the manufacturer who commissioned the commercial simply had not noticed the slip. So I had a look on line.1 It seems that the brand concerned, Herbal Essences, has a habit or topping up its products with material that is not of natural origin. The company claims it is using at least 90% materials of natural original in its latest products (see the examples below), and this is apparently seen as a positive point to stress in its marketing.
But this is just nonsense. If the shampoo was fabricated using 94% products of natural original, then 6% was not of natural origin. This leaves me to wonder where the rest originates. A shampoo, any shampoo, is 100% of natural origin.
Natural products chemistry
In chemistry there is a common term natural products which tends to be used for materials extracted from living organisms – one can extract vitamin C from oranges, and insulin for diabetics used to be extracted from pancreases from farm animals (although now it is produced by the activities of bacteria or yeast). In that sense salt (produced by evaporating sea water) and chalk (deriving from the shells debris from long dead sea organisms) are not natural products. But like everything else in the material world, salt and chalk are still of natural origin.
So what is a hair product which is not of natural origin, or which is only partially of natural origin? It seems there are two obvious contrasts to natural, which are 'unnatural' and 'supernatural'. Presumably the company was not suggesting it used ingredients of supernatural origin?
Do Herbal Essences employ a specialist formulation technologist to prepare the shampoo ingredients that are not of natural origin? (Image by pendleburyannette from Pixabay)
What makes something unnatural?
Assuming Herbal Essences products do not include material of supernatural origin, the other option would seem to be material of unnatural origin. But what makes a material unnatural.
At various times, in various cultural contexts, the divine right of kings, feudalism and slavery will have been seen as perfectly natural, as well the subservience of women to men. Certain sexual acts that are now widely (if not universally) considered part of the normal range of human behaviours have at various times in different societies been considered unnatural – indeed so unnatural that those found to have 'committed' them might be put to death.
Given that the question of 'what is human nature?' is not settled (didn't Immanuel Kant think this was the core task for philosophy?) the approach that is sometimes taken is to look instead to 'nature' herself (for nature is a 'she' as has long been established – in part justifying her domination and mistreatment by 'man'). If it happens in nature, then that's natural.
"The sun rises everyday but animals occasionally give birth to monsters. 'Natural is what occurs always or almost always', says Aristotle, generalizing from this experience."
So, by this criterion, saving lives with blood transfusions is not natural, and nor is hip replacement surgery, nor using an incubator to stop premature babies dying. However, cancer is natural. Pushing your siblings out of the nest, or pecking them to death, to get a greater share of the food your parents bring home is perfectly natural. Depositing your eggs in another creature, and paralysing it so that it acts as a defenseless (but alive, and so fresh) source of food when your offspring hatch out inside it, is natural.
"We can save you if you wish, but only by unnatural acts" (Image by Mohamed Hassan from Pixabay)
The man-made is not 'natural'
This depends upon demarcating humans as somehow outside of nature. This is difficult for a natural scientist to accept as 'ever since Darwin' (to borrow a phrase) it has been difficult to see how humans can be considered inherently distinct from the rest of the natural world, even if contingency has led to some obvious differences in terms of the development of culture. This argument then distinguishes the natural from the synthetic, the man-made.
A space rocket is not natural (in this sense) as it only exists because humans built it. Whether this is qualitatively different from technology elsewhere in nature – a badger's dam, a termite's nest, a honeycomb – rather than just a matter of a (admittedly impressive) difference of degree is an interesting question.
There are no doubt times where it is useful to distinguish between materials and objects that can be collected or extracted form 'natural' sources, and those that only exist because they have been synthesised by people – even if we do need to be wary of reading too much into the distinction. The Saturn V rocket did not exist 'in nature', and nor does a lemon coated in a wax so that it will stay 'fresh' longer – but one is the product of considerably less processing than the other. 2
Fluorine compounds (fluorides) are added to drinking water in many places to help protect teeth, but in other places the water supply already (i.e., 'naturally') contains fluoride at much higher levels – indeed, sometimes high enough to be considered a medical risk. This both reminds us that what is natural is somewhat arbitrary, and that what is considered natural is not necessarily desirable.
Natural and natural origin
The Saturn V rocket was synthetic – it was not found 'as is', growing in a swamp or being ejected from a volcano ('You Only Live Twice' style). But the materials it was made from were all of natural origin, even if some of them may have been the result of considerable processing of naturally occurring materials.
Everything you see here is of natural origin (From 'You Only Live Twice', Eon Productions)
Any material thing in our world is of natural origin. Some materials are used much as found 'in nature', sometimes some cleaning or tidying is needed (think of natural diamonds being 'cut' to best reflect light), some purifying (separating compounds from crude oil fractions), some extracting (metal from ore), some synthesising (ammonia from hydrogen and nitrogen)… The amount of processing may vary considerably, but everything material that goes into a manufactured product is ultimately of natural origin.
So Herbal Essences products are 100% of natural origin, just as are the products of all their competitors.
A vague distinction
Webpages advertising specific Herbal Essences product lines often simply report that they are of 9n% natural origin, as in the examples below (95%, 96%, 97%). However, I found a page where it was clarified that the 90+% of natural origin included "purified water and ingredient materials derived from a natural source and subjected to limited processing".
So Herbal Essences do not use natural ditch water, or natural swamp water, or even natural sea water in their products, but rather purified water. I am pleased – as I have used Herbal Essences products, and will likely do so again, and I would rather not use dirty water when I am seeking to clean my hair.
Water – easily sourced from nature, and used in hair products (Image by mac231 from Pixabay)
So, it seems that for Herbal Essences, being of natural origin actually means, natural materials found in a suitable form to be used directly, or ("natural derived") only needing a "limited" amount of processing. Limited processing is a good thing in 'green chemistry' terms (less waste, less energy needed) but it is both a vague notion (who is to decide what makes the processing 'limited', and how does a consumer know what Herbal Essences count as limited?), and of course it is simply a quite different concept to being of natural origin.
I guess the company wanted a way of saying they were basing their products on natural products (such as plant extracts) without being misleading by implying that they could simply go and collect all the component materials and use them without needing any further processing. These materials may be pressed, steamed, or separated and purified in other ways, but are not generally the outcomes of complex synthetic processes. I can see both why that would be attractive to consumers, and why it is not easy to get across in a simple catchy term.
Yet the claim that 94% of your hair product is of natural origin, when a moment's thought should lead to the consumer realising that actually all products are of 100% natural origin, is a claim that (unlike the missing 6% of your Herbal Essences brand shampoo), does not have any substance.
a "limited" amount of processing
is both a vague notion and simply a quite different concept to
being of natural origin.
Appendix: Some examples of products that are not completely of natural origin
95% natural origin
The Herbal EssencesCoconut Milk conditioner is, according to their website,
95% natural origin 73% purified water and 22% natural derived ingredients other 5% for a good usage experience & product stability.
"Fruit waxing is the process of covering fruits (and, in some cases, vegetables) with artificial [sic] waxing material. Natural [sic] wax is removed first, usually by washing, followed by a coating of a biological or petroleum derived wax. Potentially allergenic proteins (peanut, soy, dairy, wheat) may be combined with shellac."
The loneliness experiment, a.k.a. The BBC Loneliness Experiment was a study publicised through the BBC (British public service broadcaster), and in particular through it's radio programme All in the Mind, ("which covers psychology, neuroscience & mental health" according to presenter, Claudia Hammond's website.)1 It was launched back in February 2018 – pre-COVD.2
"All in the Mind: The Loneliness Experiment launches the world's largest ever survey of its kind on loneliness." https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09r6fvn
Claudia Hammond describes herself as an "award-winning broadcaster, author and psychology lecturer". In particular "She is Visiting Professor of the Public Understanding of Psychology at the University of Sussex" where according to the University of Sussex "the post has been specially created for Claudia, who studied applied psychology at the University in the 1990s", so she is very well qualified for her presenting role. (I think she is very good at this role: she has a good voice for the radio and manages to balance the dual role of being expert enough to exude authority, whilst knowing how to ask necessarily naive questions of guests on behalf of non-specialist listeners.)
Loneliness is a serious matter that affects many people, and is not be made light of. So this was a serious study, on an important topic – yet every time I heard this mentioned on the radio (and it was publicised a good deal at the time) I felt myself mentally (and sometimes physically) cringe. Even without hearing precise details of the research design, I could tell this was simply not a good experiment.
This was not due to any great insight on my behalf, but was obvious from the way the work was being described. Readers may wish to see if they can spot for themselves what so irked me.
What is the problem with this research design?
This is how the BBC described the study at its launch:
The Loneliness Experiment, devised by Professor Pamela Qualter and colleagues, aims to look at causes and possible solutions to loneliness. And we want as many people as possible to fill in our survey, even if they've never felt lonely, because we want to know what stops people feeling lonely, so that more of us can feel connected.
This is how Prof. Hammond described the research in retrospect:
55,000 people from around the world chose to take part in the BBC Loneliness Experiment, making it the world's largest ever study on loneliness. Researchers from the universities of Manchester, Brunel and Exeter, led by Professor Pamela Qualter and funded by the Wellcome Trust, developed a questionnaire asking people what they thought loneliness was, when they felt lonely and for how long.
And this is how the work is described on the University of Manchester's pages:
The Loneliness Experiment was a study conducted by BBC Radio 4's All in the Mind….
The study asked respondents to give their opinions and record their experiences of loneliness and related topics, including friendship, relationships, and the use of technology – as well as recording lifestyle and background information. Respondents also engaged in a number of experiments.
The survey was developed by Professor Pamela Qualter, from The University of Manchester's Manchester Institute of Education (MIE), with colleagues from Brunel University London, and the University of Exeter. The work was funded by a grant from The Wellcome Trust.
These descriptions make it obvious that the The Loneliness Experimentwas not an experiment. Experimentis a specific kind of research – a methodology where the researchers randomly assign participants randomly to conditions, intervene in the experimental condition,and take measurements to see what effect the intervention has by comparing with measurements in a control condition. True experiments are extremely difficult to do in the social sciences (Taber, 2019), and often quasi-experiments or natural experiments are used which do not meet all the expectations for true experiments. BUT, to be an experiment there has to be something that can be measured as changing over time in relation to specified different conditions.
Experiment involves intervention (Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay)
Experiment is not the only methodology used in research – there are also case studies, there is action research and grounded theory, for example – and non-experimental research may be entirely appropriate in certain situations, and can be of very high quality. One alternative methodology is the survey which collects data form a sample of a population at some particular time. Although surveys can be carried out in various ways (for example, through a series of observations), especially common in social science is the survey (a methodology) carried out by using participant self-responses to a questionnaire (a research instrument).
it is clear from the descriptions given by the BBC, Professor Hammond and the University of Manchester that the The Loneliness Experiment was not actually an experiment at all, but basically a survey (even if, tantalisingly, the Manchester website suggests that "Respondents also [sic] engaged in a number of experiments". )
The answer to the question 'when is an experiment not an experiment?' might simply be: when it is something other than an experiment
Completing a questionnaire (Image by Andreas Breitling from Pixabay)
What's in a name: does it really matter?
Okay, so I am being pedantic again.
But I do think this matters.
I think it is safe to assume that Prof. Hammond, Prof. Qualter and colleagues know the difference between an experiment and a survey. Presumably someone decided that labelling the research as the loneliness study or the loneliness survey would not be accessible (or perhaps not as impressive) to a general audience and so decided to incorrectly use the label experiment as if experiment was synonymous with study/research.
As a former research methods lecturer, that clearly irks as part of my job was to teach new researchers about key research concepts. But I would hope that people actually doing research or learning to do research are not going to be confused by this mislabelling.
But, as a former school science teacher, I know that there is widespread public misunderstanding of key nature of science terms such as theory and experiment. School age students do need to learn what is meant by the word experiment, and what counts as an experiment, and the BBC is being unhelpful in presenting research that is not experimental as an experiment – as this will simply reinforce common misconceptions of what the term experiment is actually used to denote in research .
So, in summary, I'll score The BBC Loneliness Experiment
2: It would have been interesting to repeat when so many people around the world were in 'lock-down'. (A comparison between pre-COVID and pandemic conditions might have offered something of a natural experiment.)
Bee-ware chemicals! (Images by PollyDot and Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay)
A recent episode of the BBC Inside science radio programme and podcast was entitled 'Bees and multiple pesticide exposure'. This discussed a very important issue that I have no wish to make light of. Researchers were looking at the stressors which might be harming honey bees, very important pollinators for many plants, and concluded that these likely act synergistically. That is a colony suffering from, say a drought and at the same time a mite infection, will show more damage that one would expect from simply adding the typical harm of each as if independent effects. Rather there are interactions.
This is hardly surprising, but is none-the-less a worrying finding.
However, my 'science teacher' radar honed in on an aspect of the language used to explain the research. The researcher interviewed was Dr Harry Siviter of the University of Texas at Austin. As part of his presentation he suggested that…
"Exposure to multiple pesticides is the norm, not the exception. So, for example a study in North America showed that the average number of chemicals found in a honey bee colony is six, with a high of 42. So, we know that bees are exposed to multiple chemicals…"
The phrase that stood out for me was "the average number of chemicals found in a honey bee colony is six" as clearly that did not make any sense scientifically. At least, not if the term 'chemical' was meant to refer to 'chemical substance'. I cannot claim to know just how many different substances would be found if one analysed honey bee colonies, but I am pretty confident the average would be orders of magnitude greater than six. An organism such as a bee (leaving aside for a moment the hive in which it lives) will be, chemically, 'made up' of a great many different proteins, amino acids, lipids, sugars, nuclei acids, and so forth.
"the average number of chemicals found in a honey bee colony is six"
From the context, I understood that Dr Siviter was not really talking about chemicals in general, but pesticides. So, I am (not for the first time) being a pedant in pointing out that technically he was wrong to suggest "the average number of chemicals found in a honey bee colony is six" as any suitably informed listener would have immediately, and unproblematically, understood what he meant by 'chemicals' in this context.
Yet, as a teacher, my instinct is to consider that programmes such as this, designed to inform the public about science, are not only heard by those who are already well-versed in the sciences. By its nature, BBC Inside Science is intended to engage with a broad audience, and has a role in educating the public about science. I also knew that this particular pedantic point linked to a genuine issue in science teaching.
A common alternative conception
The term chemical is not usually used in science discourse as such, but rather the term substance. Chemical substances are ubiquitous, although in most everyday contexts we do not come across many pure samples of single substances. Tap water is nearly all water, and table salt is usually about 99% sodium chloride, and sometimes metals such as copper or aluminium are used in more or less pure form. But these tend to be exceptions – most material entities we engage with are not pure substances ('chemicals'), rather being mixtures or even more complex (e.g., wood or carrot or hair).
In everyday life, the term chemical tends to be used more loosely – so, for example, household bleach may be considered 'a chemical'. More problematically 'chemicals' tends to be seen as hazardous, and often even poisonous. So, people object to there being 'chemicals' in their food – when of course their food comprises chemicals and we eat food to access those chemicals because we are also made up of a great many chemicals. Food with the chemicals removed is not food, or indeed, anything at all!
In everyday discourse 'chemical' is often associated with 'dangerous' (Image by Arek Socha from Pixabay)
So, science teachers not only have the problem that in everyday discourse the term 'chemical' does not map unproblematically on 'substance' (as it is often used also for mixtures), but even more seriously that chemicals are assumed to be bad, harmful, undesirable – something to be avoided and excluded. By contrast, the scientific perspective is that whilst some chemicals are potentially very harmful, others are essential for life. Therefore, it is unhelpful when science communicators (whether journalists, or scientists themselves) use the term 'chemical' to refer only to potentially undesirable chemicals (which even then tend to be undesirable only in certain contexts), such as pesticides which are found in, and may harm, pollinators.
I decided to dig into the background of the item.
The news item
I found a news item in 'the Conversation' that discuses the work.
Dr Siviter's Article in the Conversation
It began
"A doctor will always ask if you are on any other medication before they write you a prescription. This is because pharmaceuticals can interact with each other and potentially disrupt the treatment, or even harm the patient. But when agrochemicals, such as pesticides, are licensed for use on farms, little attention is paid to how they interact with one another, and so their environmental impact is underestimated."
Siviter, 2021
This seemed a very good point, made with an analogy that seemed very telling.
"We analysed data gathered in scientific studies from the last two decades and found that when bees are exposed to a combination of pesticides, parasites and poor nutrition, the negative impact of each is exacerbated. We say that the cumulative effect of all these things is synergistic, meaning that the number of bees that are killed is more than we would predict if the negative effects were merely added together."
Siviter, 2021
This seems important work, and raises an issue we should be concerned about. The language used here was subtly different from in the radio programme:
"Many agrochemicals, such as neonicotinoids, are systemic, meaning they accumulate in the environment over several months, and in some cases years. It is perhaps not surprising then that honeybee colonies across the US have on average six different agrochemicals present in their wax, with one hive contaminated with 39 [sic, not 42]. It's not just honeybees which are at risk, though: wild bees such as bumblebees are also routinely exposed."
Siviter, 2021
So, here it was not 'chemicals' that were being counted but 'agrochemicals' (and the average figure of 6 now referred not to the colony as a whole, but only to the beeswax.)
The meta-analysis
'Agrochemicals' was also the term used in the research paper in the prestigious journal Naturewhere the research had been first reported,
"we conducted a meta-analysis of 356 interaction effect sizes from 90 studies in which bees were exposed to combinations of agrochemicals, nutritional stressors and/or parasites."
Siviter, et al., 2021
A meta-analysis is a type of secondary research study which collects results form a range of related published studies and seeks to identify overall patterns.
The original research
Moreover, the primary study being referred to as the source of the dubious statistic (i.e., that "the average number of chemicals found in a honey bee colony is six") referred not to 'chemicals' but to "pesticides and metabolites" (that is, substances which would be produced as the bee's metabolism broke the pesticides down):
"We have found 121 different pesticides and metabolites within 887 wax, pollen, bee and associated hive samples….
Almost all comb and foundation wax samples (98%) were contaminated with up to 204 and 94 ppm [parts per million], respectively, of fluvalinate and coumaphos, and lower amounts of amitraz degradates and chlorothalonil, with an average of 6 pesticide detections per sample and a high of 39."
Mullin, et al., 2010
Translation and representation
Scientific research is reported in research journals primarily for the benefit of other researchers in the field, and so is formatted and framed accordingly – and this is reflected in the language used in primary sources.
A model of the flow of scientific to public knowledge (after McInerney et al., 2004)
It is important that science which impacts on us all, and is often funded from public funds, is accessible to the public. Science journalism, is an important conduit for the communication of science, and for his to be effective it has to be composed with non-experts in the public in mind.
It is perfectly sensible and desirable for a scientist engaging with a public audience to moderate technical language to make the account of research more accessible for a non-specialist audience. This kind of simplification is also a core process in developing science curriculum and teaching.
However, in the case of 'chemical' I would suggest scientists take care with using the term (and avoid it if possible), as science teachers commonly have to persuade students that chemicals are all around of us, are not always bad for us, are part of us, and are essential. That pesticides and their breakdown products have been so widely detected in bee colonies is a matter of concern, as pesticides are substances that are used because of their detrimental effects on many insects and other organisms that might damage crops.
Whilst that is science deserving public attention, there are a good many more than 6 chemicals in any bee colony, and – indeed – we would want most of them to be there.
References:
McInerney, C., Bird, N., & Nucci, M. (2004). The Flow of Scientific Knowledge from Lab to the Lay Public: The Case of Genetically Modified Food. Science Communication, 26(1), 44-74. doi:10.1177/1075547004267024 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1075547004267024
Mullin, C. A., Frazier, M., Frazier, J. L., Ashcraft, S., Simonds, R., vanEngelsdorp, D., & Pettis, J. S. (2010). High Levels of Miticides and Agrochemicals in North American Apiaries: Implications for Honey Bee Health. 5(3): e9754. PLoS ONE, 5(3), e9754. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009754 https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0009754
Siviter, H., Bailes, E. J., Martin, C. D., Oliver, T. R., Koricheva, J., Leadbeater, E., & Brown, M. J. F. (2021). Agrochemicals interact synergistically to increase bee mortality. Nature. doi:10.1038/s41586-021-03787-7 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03787-7
As part of the primary scientific literature, it publishes articles written by specialist scientists in a technical language intended to be understood by other specialists. Dense scientific terminology is not used to deliberately exclude general readers (as sometimes suggested), but is necessary for scientists to make a convincing case for new knowledge claims that seem persuasive to other specialists. This requires being precise, using unambiguous technical language."The thingamajig kind of, er, attaches to the erm, floppy bit, sort of" would not do the job.
Science News however is news media – it publishes journalism (indeed, 'since 1921' the site reports – although that's the publication and not its website of course.) While science journalism is not essential to the internal processes of science (which rely on researchers engaging with each other's work though scholarly critique and dialogue) it is very important for the public's engagement with science, and for the accountability of researchers to the wider community.
Science journalists have a job similar to science teachers – to communicate abstract ideas in a way that makes sense to their audience. So, they need to interpret research and explain it in ways that non-specialists can understand.
The news article told me
"Like a shaggy dog in springtime, some black holes have to shed… Unlike dogs with their varied fur coats, isolated black holes are mostly identical. They are characterized by only their mass, spin and electric charge. According to a rule known as the no-hair theorem, any other distinguishing characteristics, or "hair," are quickly cast off. That includes magnetic fields."
Conover, 2013
Here there is clearly the use of an analogy – as a black hole is not the kind of thing that has actual hair. This would seem to be an example of a journalist creating an analogy (just as a science teacher would) to help 'make the unfamiliar familiar' to her readers:
just as
dogs with lots of hair need to shed some ready for the warmer weather (a reference to a familiar everyday situation)
so, too, do
black holes (no so familiar to most people) need to lose their hair…
Surely a better analogy would be along the lines that just as dogs with lots of hair need to shed some ready for the warmer weather, so to do black holes need to lose their magnetic fields…
An analogy is used to show a novel conceptual structure (here, relating to magnetic fields around black holes) maps onto a more familiar, or more readily appreciated, one (here, that a shaggy dog will shed some of its fur). A teaching analogy may not reflect a deep parallel between two systems, as its function may be just to introduce an abstract principle.
Conover did not invent the 'hair' reference for her ScienceNews piece – rather she built her analogy on a term used by the scientists themselves. Indeed, the title of the cited research journal article was "Magnetic Hair and Reconnection in Black Hole Magnetospheres", and it was a study exploring the consequences of the "no-hair theorem" – as the authors explained in their abstract:
"The no-hair theorem of general relativity states that isolated black holes are characterized [completely described] by three parameters: mass, spin, and charge."
Bransgrove, Ripperda & Philippov, 2021
However, some black holes "are born with magnetic fields" or may "acquire magnetic flux later in life", in which case the fields will vary between black holes (giving an additional parameter for distinguishing them). The theory suggests that these black holes should somehow lose any such field: that is, "The fate of the magnetic flux (hair) on the event horizon should be in accordance with the no-hair theorem of general relativity" (Bransgrove, Ripperda & Philippov, 2021: 1). There would have to be a mechanism by which this occurs (as energy will be conserved, even when dealing with black holes).
So, the study was designed to explore whether such black holes would indeed lose their 'hair'. Despite the use of this accessible comparison (magnetic flux as 'hair'), the text of the paper is pretty heavy going for someone not familiar with that area of science:
"stationary, asymptotically flat BH spacetimes…multipole component l of a magnetic field…self-regulated plasma…electron-positron discharges…nonzero stress-energy tensor…instability…plasmoids…reconnection layer…relativistic velocities…highly magnetized collisionless plasma…Lundquist number regime…Kerr-schild coordinates…dimensionless BH spin…ergosphere volume…spatial hypersurfaces…[…and so it continues]"
(Bransgrove, Ripperda & Philippov, 2021: 1).
"Come on Harry, you know full well that 'the characteristic minimum plasma density required to support the rotating magnetosphere is the Goldreich-Julian number density' [Bransgrove, Ripperda & Philippov, 2021: 2], so hand me that hyperspanner." Image from Star Trek: Voyager (Paramount Pictures)
Spoiler alert
I do not think I will spoil anything by revealing that Bransgrove and colleague conclude from their work that "the no-hair theorem holds": that there is a 'balding process' – the magnetic field decays ("all components of the stress-energy tensor decay exponentially in time"). If any one reading this is wondering how they did this work, given that most laboratory stores do not keep black holes in stock to issue to researchers on request, it is worth noting the study was based on a computer simulation.
That may seem to be rather underwhelming as the researchers are just reporting what happens in a computer model, but a lot of cutting-edge science is done that way. Moreover, their simulations produced predictions of how the collapsing magnetic fields of real black holes might actually be detected in terms of the kinds of radiation that should be produced.
As the news item explained matters:
Magnetic reconnection in balding black holes could spew X-rays that astronomers could detect. So scientists may one day glimpse a black hole losing its hair.
Conover, 2013
So, we have hairy black holes that go through a balding process when they lose their hair – which can be tested in principle because they will be spewing radiation.
Balding is to hair, as…
Here we have an example of an analogy for a scientific concept. Analogies compare one phenomenon or concept to another which is considered to have some structural similarity (as in the figure above). When used in teaching and science communication such analogies offer one way to make the unfamiliar familiar, by showing how the unfamiliar system maps in some sense onto a more familiar one.
hair = magnetic field
balding = shedding the magnetic field
Black holes are expected to be, or at least to become, 'hairless' – so without having magnetic fields detectable from outside the event horizon (the 'surface' connecting points beyond which everything, even light, is unable to 'escape' the gravitational field and leave the black hole). If black holes are formed with, or acquire, such magnetic fields, then there is expected to be a 'balding' process. This study explored how this might work in certain types of (simulated) black holes – as magnetic field lines (that initially cross the event horizon) break apart and reconnect. (Note that in this description the magnetic field lines – imaginary lines invented by Michael Faraday as a mental tool to think about and visualise magnetic fields – are treated as though they are real objects!)
Some such comparisons are deliberately intended to help scientists explain their ideas to the public – but scientists also use such tactics to communicate to each other (sometimes in frivolous or humorous ways) and in these cases such expressions may do useful work as short-hand expressions.
So, in this context hair denotes anything that can be detected and measured from outside a black hole apart form its mass, spin, and charge (see, it is much easier to say 'hair')- such as magnetic flux density if there is a magnetic field emerging from the black hole.
A dead metaphor?
In the research paper, Bransgrove, Ripperda and Philippov do not use the 'hair' comparison as an analogy to explain ideas about black holes. Rather they take the already well-established no-hair theorem as given background to their study ("The original no-hair conjecture states that…"), and simply explain their work in relation to it ("The fate of the magnetic flux (hair) on the event horizon should be in accordance with the no-hair theorem of general relativity.")
Whereas an analogy uses an explicit comparison (this is like that because…), a comparison that is not explained is best seen as a metaphor. A metaphor has 'hidden meaning'. Unlike in an analogy, the meaning is only implied.
"The no-hair theorem of general relativity states that isolated black holes are characterized by three parameters: mass, spin, and charge";
"The original no-hair conjecture states that all stationary, asymptotically flat BH [black hole] spacetimes should be completely described by the mass, angular momentum, and electric charge"
Bransgrove and colleagues do not need to explain why they use the term 'hair' in their research report as in their community it has become an accepted expression where researchers already know what it is intended to mean. We might consider it a dead metaphor, an expression which was originally used to imply meaning through some kind of comparison, but which through habitual use has taken on literal meaning.
Science has lots of these dead metaphors – terms like electrical charge and electron spin have with repeated use over time earned their meanings without now needing recourse to their origins as metaphors. This can cause confusion as, for example, a learner may develop alternative conceptions about electron spin if they do not appreciate its origin as a metaphor, and assumes an electron spins in the same sense as as spinning top or the earth in space. Then there is an associative learning impediment as the learner assumes an electron is spinning on its axis because of the learner's (perfectly reasonable) associations for the word 'spin'.
The journalist or 'science writer' (such as Emily Conover), however, is writing for a non-specialist readership, so does need to explain the 'hair' reference. So, I would characterise the same use of the terms hair/no-hair and balding as comprising a science analogy in the news item, but a dead metaphor in the context of the research paper. The meaning of language, after all, is in the mind of the reader.
Is the work of cognition like the work of a palaeontologist? (Image by Brenda Geisse from Pixabay)
I like the reflexive nature of this account – of someone reconstructing an analogy
abouthow cognition reconstructs coherent wholes from partial, fragmented data
froma partial, fragmented memory representation.
I was reading something about memory function that piqued my interest in an analogy:
"Neisser, using an analogy initially developed by Hebb (1949) to characterize [sic] perception, likened the rememberer to a paleontologist who attempts to reconstruct a dinosaur from fragmentary remains: 'out of a few stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur'…"
Schacter, 1995, p.10
I was interested enough to look up the original use of this analogy (as I report below).
This links to three things that have separately interested me:
using analogies in teaching and comunicating science
The nature of our memories
I have long been interested in what memory is and how it works – and its role in academic learning (Taber, 2003). In part this perhaps derives from the limits of my own memory – I have been reasonably successful academically, but have never felt I had a good memory (and I seem to get more 'absent minded' all the time). This interest grew as it became clearer to me that our memory experiences seem to be quite different – my late wife Philippa would automatically and effortlessly remember things in a way that that seemed to me to be a kind of superpower. (She was once genuinely surprised that I could not picture what a family member had been wearing on arriving at a family event years before, whereas I thought I was doing pretty well to even remember I had been there.) Now that neurodiversity is widely recognised, it seems less surprising that we do not all experience memory in the same way.
A lot of people, however, understand memory in terms of a kind of folk-model (that is, a popular everyday account which does not match current scientific understanding) – along the lines that we put information into a memory store, where – unless it gets lost and we forget – we can later access it and so remember what it was that we committed to memory. Despite the ubiquity of that notion, research suggests that is not really how memory functions. We might say that this is a common alternative conception of how memory works.
Schacter was referring back to a tradition that began a century ago when Bartlett carried out a series of studies on memory. Bartlett (1932/1995) would, for example, expose people to a story that was unfamiliar to his study participants, and then later ask them to retell as much of the story as they could remember. As might be expected, some people remembered more details than others.
What perhaps was less predictable at the time was the extent to which people included in their retelling details that had not been part of the original story at all. These people were not deliberately embellishing or knowingly guessing, but reporting, as best they could, what their memory suggested had been part of the original story.
People who habitually exhibit this 'confabulation' to an pathological degree (perhaps remembering totally fantastic things that clearly could not be true) are recognised as having some kind of problem, but it transpires this is just an extreme of something that is normal behavior. Remembering is not the 'pulling something out of storage' that we may experience it as – as actually what we remember is more like a best guess based on insufficient data (but a guess made preconsciously, so it appears in our conscious minds as definitive) than a pristine copy of an original experience. Memory is often more a matter of constructing an account from the materials at hand than simply reading it out from something stored.
Thus the analogy. Here is some wider context for the quote presented above:
"The publication of Neisser's (1967) important monograph on cognitive psychology rekindled interest in Bartlett's ideas about schemas and reconstructive memory. According to Neisser, remembering the past is not a simple matter of reawakening a dormant engram or memory trace; past events are constructed by using preexisting knowledge and [schemata] to piece together whatever fragmentary remains of the initial episode are available in memory. Neisser, using an analogy initially developed by Hebb (1949) to characterize [sic] perception, likened the rememberer to a paleontologist who attempts to reconstruct a dinosaur from fragmentary remains: 'out of a few stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur' (1967, p.285). In this view, all memories are constructions because they include general knowledge that was not part of a specific event, but is necessary to reconstruct it. The fundamentally constructive nature of memory in turn makes it susceptible to various kinds of distortions and inaccuracies. Not surprisingly, Neisser embraced Bartlett's observations and ideas about the nature of memory."
Schacter, 1995, p.10
These ideas will not seem strange to those who have studied science education, a field which has been strongly influenced by a 'constructivist' perspective on learning. Drawing on learning science research, the constructivist perspective focuses on how each learner has to build up their own knowledge incrementally: it is not possible for a teacher to take some complex technical knowledge and simply transfer it (or copy it) to a learner's mind wholesale.
Excavating the analogy: what did Hebb actually say?
Hebb is remembered for his work on understanding the brain in terms of neural structures – neurons connected into assemblies through synapses. His book 'The Organization of Behavior' has been described as "one of the most influential books in Psychology and Neuroscience" (Brown, 2020: 1).
The analogy referred to by Schacter was used by Hebb in describing perception. He discussed studies using a tachistoscope, an instrument for displaying images for very brief periods. This could be used to show an image to a person with an exposure insufficient for them to take in all the details,
"…the pattern is perceived, first, as a familiar one, and then with something missing or something added. The something, also, is familiar; so the total perception is a mélange of the habitual.
The subject's reports [make it] clear that the subject is not only responding to the diagram as a whole; he perceives its parts as separate entities, even though presentation is so brief. Errors are prominent, and such as to show that all the subject really perceives–and then only with rough accuracy–is the slope of a few lines and their direction and distance from one another"
Hebb, 1949: pp.46-47
That is, the cognitive system uses the 'clues' available from the incomplete visual data to build (in effect) a hypothesis of what was seen, based on correspondences between the data actually available and familiar images that match that limited data. What the person becomes consciously aware of 'seeing' is not actually a direct report from the visual field of the presented image, but a constructed image that is a kind of conjecture of what might have been seen – 'filling-in' missing data with what seems most likely based on past visual experiences.
Cognitive scientist Annette Karmiloff-Smith developed the concept of 'representational redescription' as a way of describing how initially tacit knowledge could eventually become explicit. She suggested that "intra-domain and inter-domain representational relations are the hallmark of a flexible and creative cognitive system" (Karmiloff-Smith,1996: 192). The gist was that the brain is able to re-represent its own internal representations in new forms with different affordances.
An loose analogy might be someone who takes a screenshot when displaying an image from the JPEG photo collection folder on the computer, opens the screenshot as a pdf file, and then adds some textual annotations before exporting the file to a new pdf. The representation of the original image is unchanged in the system, but a new representation has been made of it in a different form, which has then been modified and 'stored' (represented) in a different folder.
Hebb was describing how a representation of visual data at one level in the cognitive system has been represented elsewhere in the system (representational redescription?) at a level where it can be mentipulated by 'filling-in'.
"A drawing or a report of what is seen tachistoscopically is not unlike a paleontologist's reconstruction of early man from a tooth and a rib. There is a clear effect of earlier experience, filling in gaps in the actual perception, so that the end result is either something familiar or a combination of familiar things–a reconstruction on the basis of experience."
Hebb, 1949: p.47
Teaching analogies
Hebb was writing a book that can be considered as a textbook, so this can be seen as a teaching analogy, although such analogies are also used in communicating science in other contexts.
Teaching is about making the unfamiliar familiar, and one way we do that is by saying that 'this unfamiliar thing you need to learn about is a bit like this other thing that you already know about'. Of course, when teaching in this way we need to say in what way there is an analogy, and it may also be important to say in what ways the two things are not alike if we do not want people to map across irrelevant elements (i.e., to develop 'associative' learning impediments).
Hebb is saying that visual perception is often not simply the detection of a coherent and integral image, but is rather a construction produced by building upon the available data to construct a coherent and integral image. In extremis, a good deal may be made of very little scraps of input – akin to a scientist reconstructing a model of a full humanoid body based on a couple of bits of bone or tooth.
There are examples where palaeontologists or anthropologists have indeed suggested such complete forms based on a few fossil fragments as data. This is only possible because of their past experiences of meeting many complete forms, and the parts of which they are made. (And of course, sometimes other scientists completely disagree about their reconstructions!)
An exscientific analogy?
Often in teaching science we use teaching analogies that compare an unfamiliar scientific concept to some familiar everyday phenomenon – perhaps a reaction profile is a bit like a roller-coaster track. Perhaps we could call these adscientific analogies as the meaning is transferred to the scientific concept from the everyday.
Sometimes, however, familiar scientific phenomena or ideas are used as the source – as here. Perhaps these could be called exscientific analogies as the meaning is taken from the science concept and applied elsewhere.
Developing the palaeontology analogy
So, Hebb had originally used the palaeontology analogy in the context of discussing perception. When I looked into how Neisser had used the comparison in his "important monograph on cognitive psychology" I found he had developed the analogy, returning to it at several points in his book.
Do we analyse what we attend to?
Neisser's first reference was also in relation to perception, rather than memory. Neisser argued that before we can attend to part of a scene there must already have been the operation of "preattentive mechanisms, which form segregated objects" from which we can select what to attend to. These processes might be referred to as analyses:
"…the detailed properties and features that we ordinarily see in an attended figure…arise…only because part of the input was selected for attention and certain operations then performed on it. Neither the object of analysis nor the nature of the analysis is inevitable, and both may vary in different observers and at different times."
Neisser, 1967, p.94
But Neisser was not sure this really was 'analysis', which he understood as drawing on another (what I labelled above) exscientific analogy:
"The very word 'analysis' may not be apt. It suggests an analogy with chemistry: a chemist 'analyses' unknown substances to find out what they 'really' are."
Neisser, 1967, p.94
Rather than refer to analysis, we could draw on Hebb's palaeontological analogy:
"More appropriate…is Hebb's (1949, p.47) comparison of the perceiver with a paleontologist, who carefully extracts a few fragments of what might be bones from a mass of irrelevant rubble and 'reconstructs' the dinosaur that will eventually stand in the Museum of Natural History. In this sense it is important to think of focal attention as a constructive, synthetic activity rather than as purely analytic. One does not simply examine the input and make a decision; one builds an appropriate visual object."
Neisser draws upon the analogy repeatedly in developing his account of perception:
"Such emotion-flooded experiences [as 'physiognomic' perception: 'Everyone has perceived such traits as suppressed anger in a face, gaiety in a movement, or peaceful harmony in a picture'] can be thought of as the result of particular kinds of construction. The same fragments of bone that lead one paleontologist to make an accurate model of an unspectacular creature might lead another, perhaps more anxious or more dramatic, to 'reconstruct' a nightmarish monster." (pp.96-97)
"To 'direct attention' to a figure is to attempt a more extensive synthesis of it. Of course, synthesis presupposes some prior analysis, as the paleontologist must have some fragments of bone before he can build his dinosaur…" (p.103)
"Recognition, whether of spelling patterns or words as wholes, must be mediated by relevant features, as meaningless in themselves as the bone chips of the paleontologist." (p.114)
"The process of figural synthesis does not depend only on the features extracted from the input, just as the dinosaur constructed by a paleontologist is not based only on the bone chips he has found. Equally important is the kind of perceptual object the perceiver is prepared to construct. The importance of set and context on the perception of words has been demonstrated in a great many experiments." (pp.115-116)
Neisser, 1967
And as with perception, so memory…
When Neisser discusses memory he uses a kind of double analogy – suggesting that memory is a bit like perception, which (as already established) is a bit like the work of the palaeontologist:
"Perception is constructive, but the input information often plays the largest single role in determining the constructive process. A very similar role, it seems to me, is played by the aggregate of information stored in long-term memory.
This is not to say that the stimuli themselves are copied and stored; far from it. The analogy being offered asserts only that the role which stored information plays in recall is like the role which stimulus information plays in perception….The model of the paleontologist, which was applied to perception and focal attention in Chapter 4, applies also to memory: out of a few stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur….one does not recall objects or responses simply because traces of them exist in the mind, but after an elaborate process of reconstruction, (which usually makes use of relevant stored information).
What is the information – the bone chips – on which reconstruction is based? The only plausible possibility is that it consists of traces of prior processes of construction. There are no stored copies of finished mental events, like images or sentences, but only traces of earlier constructive activity."
Neisser, 1967, p.285
Fleshing-out the metaphor
Neisser then pushes the analogy one step further, by pointing out that the 'fleshed-out' model of a dinosaur in the museum may be constructed in part based on the fossil fragments of bones, but those fragments themselves do not form part of the construction (the model). The bones are used as referents in building the skeletal framework (literally, the skeleton) around which the model will be built, but the model is made from other materials (wood, steel, fibreglass, whatever) and the fossil fragments themselves will be displayed separately or perhaps filed away in a drawer in the museum archives. (As in the representational redescription model – the original representation is redescribed at another level of the system.)
"The present proposal is, therefore, that we store traces of earlier cognitive acts, not of the products of those acts. The traces are not simply 'revised' or 'reactivated' in recall; instead, the stored fragments are used as information to support a new construction. It is as if the bone fragments used by the paleontologist did not appear in the model he builds at all – as indeed they need not, if it to represent a fully fleshed-out skin-covered dinosaur. The bones can be thought of, somewhat loosely, as remnants of the structure which created and supported the original dinosaur, and thus as sources of information about how to reconstruct it."
A final reference to the analogy is used when Neisser addresses the question of the cognitive executive: the notion that somewhere in the cognitive system there is something akin to an overseer who direct operations:
"Who does the turning, the trying, and the erring" Is there a little man in the head, a homonculus, who acts the part of the paleontologist vis-à-vis the dinosaur? p.293
Neisser, 1967, p.293
The homonculus can be pictured as a small person sitting in the brain's control room, for example, viewing the images being projected from the visual input.
It is usually considered this is a flawed model (potentially lading to an infinite regress), a failure to take a systemic view of the cognitive system. It is the system which functions and leads to our conscious experience of perceiving, attending, making decisions, planning, remembering, and so forth. Whilst there are specialist components (modules) including for the coordination of the system, there is not a discrete controller overlaying the system as a whole who is doing the seeing, hearing, thinking, etcetera based on outputs from processing by the system.
Here the homonculus would like an authority that the palaeontologist turned to in order to decide how to build her model: raising the question of how does that expert know, and who would they, in turn, ask?
Why change Hebb's orignal analogy?
Altohugh Neisser refers to the analogy as being that used by Hebb, he modifies it. A tooth and rib become fragments of bone, and the early man becomes a dinosaur. Whether the shift from the reconstruction of an early hominid to the reconstruction of a terrible lizard was a deliberate one (for greater effect? because Neisser thought it would be more familiar to his readers?) or not I do not know. The phrasing suggests that Neisser thought he was applying Hebb's original comparison – so I suspect this is how he recalled the analogy.
Perhaps Neisser had regularly used the analogy in his teaching, in which case it may have become so familiar to him that he did not feel the need to check the original version. That is, perhaps he was correctly remembering how he had previously misremembered the original analogy. That is not fanciful, as memory researchers suggest this is something that is very common. Each time we access a memory the wider representational context becomes modified by engagement with it.
That is, if what is represented (in 'long-term memory'*) is indeed "traces of prior processes of construction…traces of earlier constructive activity" then each time a 'memory' is experienced, by being constructed based on what is represented ('in memory'*), new traces of that process of constructing the memory are left in the system.
It is possible over the years to be very convinced about the accuracy of a distorted memory that has been regularly reinforced. (The extent to which this may in part be the origin of many wars, feuds, and divorces might be a useful focus for research?)
So perhaps Neisser had represented in his long-term memory the analogy of a palaeontologist with a few fossil fragments, and when he sought to access the analogy, perhaps in a classroom presentation, the other elements were filled-in: the 'tooth and rib' became 'a few fragments of what might be bones' and the 'early man' become 'a dinosaur' – details that made sense of the analogy in terms familiar to Neisser.
The account of cognition that Hebb, Neisser and Schater were presenting would suggest that if this had been the case then for Neisser there would be no apparent distinction between the parts of Hebb's analogy that Neisser was remembering accurately, and the parts his preconscious mind had filled-in to construct a coherent analogy. I like the reflexive nature of this account – of someone reconstructing an analogy about how cognition reconstructs coherent wholes from partial, fragmented data – from a partial, fragmented memory representation.
Sources cited:
Bartlett, F. C. (1932/1995). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, R. E. (2020). Donald O. Hebb and the Organization of Behavior: 17 years in the writing. Molecular Brain, 13(1), 55. doi:10.1186/s13041-020-00567-8
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organisation of Behaviour. A neuropsychological theory. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1996). Beyond Modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Schacter, D. L. (1995). Memory distortion: history and current status. In D. L. Schacter (Ed.), Memory Distortion. How minds, brains, and societies reconstruct the past (pp. 1-43). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
* terms like 'in memory' and 'in long-term memory' may bring to mind the folk-notion of memory as somewhere in the brain where things are stored away, whereas it is probably better to think of the brain as a somewhat plastic processing system which is constantly being modified by its own functioning. The memory we experience is simply the outcome of active processing** in part of the system that has previously been modified by earlier mental activity (** active processing which is in turn itself further modifying the system).
I am writing this open letter to the Institute of Physics and the Royal Society of Chemistry to request that as Learned Societies with some influence with government (perhaps limited, but certainly vastly more than an academic) the Societies might ask the Department for Education to correct two basic errors of science in the National Curriculum for England which is set out as the basis for teaching school age learerns and for developing public examinations specifications and papers.
The two errors relate to (a) the misuse of scientific terminology (the word substance) and (b) a failure of logic (in a reference to conservation of energy).
As you will no doubt be aware, the original published version of this iteration of the programmes of study for science in the English National Curriculum included some basic errors (incorrect physics formulae) that received wide publicity and which were quickly amended. Despite some other issues also getting early attention, these other problems have never been addressed. One more complex issue that I strongly feel deserves addressing, but which would would require considerable redrafting, is the confused and incoherent treatment of the nature of chemical reactions across the secondary phase (Key Stages 3 and 4).
I have raised these issues at various times, and have published a scholarly analysis of these problems .Whilst I obviously did not expect an article in an academic journal to directly impact policy, I thought this could be a 'springboard' to then approach government. I have contacted the relevant ministers (the Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP, Secretary of State for Education and the Rt Hon Nick Gibb MP, Minister of State for School Standards), and in response to instructions to refer this issue to the Department for Education website, I did so. My comments have been noted, but I was informed
"there are no current plans to review the curriculum".
Whilst I accept that any detailed re-working of the curriculum is not imminent, I do think the Department could still instigate minor corrections to errors which are published on the government's website, and then consequently repeated by the examination authorities, the examination boards and even individual school websites. Correcting these (surely, embarrassing) errors would require very little effort.
The first error I refer to is the incorrect use of the term 'substance'. In science, the term substance has a fairly specific meaning. Although, as with many science concepts, there may be some discussion over precise definitions and demarcations, there is general agreement at the level at which the term would be used in introductory science at school level. In the primary stages of the English National Curriculum for Science we read that Y5 learners should be
"taught to…explain that some changes result in the formation of new materials [sic], and that this kind of change is not usually reversible, including changes associated with burning and the action of acid on bicarbonate of soda".
A better term here would be 'substances', not 'materials' (although this is more a mater of the wording being imprecise than incorrect). However in relation to Y4 learners there is a reference to
"exploring the effect of temperature on substances [sic] such as chocolate, butter, cream"
none of which are substances as the word is used in science.This is a misuse of the term 'substance'. So whereas in secondary school, learners are taught to distinguish the meanings of 'material' and the more specific 'substance', it seems these terms are being used interchangeably in the National Curriculum specification itself.
The other issue relates to the statement (in the Key Stage 4 specification) that
"energy is conserved in chemical reactions so can therefore be neither created nor destroyed".
To my reading this suggests a blatant error of logic, which I can only assume does not reflect scientific ignorance by the person drafting the document – but more likely is a typographic error that has never been corrected.
Conservation of energy is a general (universal) principle, and its more specific application to chemical reactions as one class of changes is then subsumed under that principle. I have long assumed that what had been intended (but mistyped) was either "energy is conserved in chemical reactions BECAUSE it can be neither created nor destroyed" or "energy CAN be neither created nor destroyed SO THEREFORE is conserved in chemical reactions" – that is, the logic has been completely reversed in the curriculum document.
I have recently realised that there is a third possibility: that this statement is not meant as an explanation (of energy conservation in reactions under a more general principle) but as a definition, along the lines "energy is conserved in chemical reactions WHICH MEANS THAT IT CAN be neither created nor destroyed".
Whatever was meant, the current wording implies a logical non sequitur, and should, surely, be corrected.
I would hope you might agree that these kinds of errors should not be included in what teachers are asked to teach, students to learn, and examining boards to assess; and that when a suitable opportunity arrises you might make appropriate representations regarding the desirability of corrections being made.
Your sincerely,
Dr Keith S.Taber
Emeritus Professor of Science Education
(I have had constructive replies from both the RSC and IoP)
Do species become more different from one another to avoid breeding?
Keith S. Taber
A tamarin monkeyA different tamarin
They say "opposites attract". True perhaps for magnetic poles and electrical charges, but the aphorism is usually applied to romantic couples. It seems like one of those sayings that survives due to the 'confirmation bias' in human cognition. That is, as long as from time to time seemingly unlikely couplings occur, the explanation that 'opposites attract' seems to have some merit, even in it only applies to a minority of cases.
Apparently, in the area of overlap the red-handed tamarins seemed to have adapted one of their calls so it sounds very similar to that of the pied tamarins. (N.b. The images above represent two contrasting species, just as an illustration.) The suggested explanation was that this modification made it more likely that the monkeys of different types would recognise each other's calls – in particular that "…they are trying to be understood, so they don't end up in a fight…".
Anthropomorphism?
I wondered if these monkeys were really "trying" to achieve this, or whether this might be an anthropomorphism. That is, were the red-handed tamarins deliberately changing their call in this way in order to ensure they could be understood – or was this actually natural selection in operation – where, because there was an advantage to cross-species communication (and there will be a spread of call characteristics in any population), over time calls that could be understood by monkeys of both species would be selected for in a shared niche.
Then again, primates are fairly intelligent creatures, so perhaps Dr Dunn (who, unlike me is an evolutionary biologist) means this literally, and this is something deliberate. Certainly, if the individual monkeys are shifting their calls over time in response to environmental cues, rather than the shift just occurring across generations, then that would seem to suggest this is learning rather than evolution. (Of course, it could be implicit learning based on feedback from the responses to their behavior, and still may not be the monkeys consciously adopting a strategy to be better understood.)
Becoming more distinct
Dr Dunn's explanation of the wider issue of how similar animals will compete for scarce resources intrigued me:
"When you have species that are closely related to one another and live in sort of overlapping areas there's quite a lot of pressure because they're likely to be competing for key resources. So, sometimes we see that these species actually diverge in their traits, they become more different from one another. Examples of that are sort of coloration and the way that animals look. Quite often they become more distinct than you would expect them to, to avoid breeding [sic] with one another."
My initial reaction to this was to wonder why the two species of monkeys needed to avoid breeding with each other. 'Breeding' normally refers to producing offspring, reproduction, but usually breeding is not possible across species (except sometimes to produce infertile hybrids).
Presumably, all tamarins descended from a common ancestor species. Speciation may have occurred when different populations become physically separated and so were no longer able to inter-breed (although still initially sexually compatible) simply because members of the two groups never encountered each other. Over time (i.e., many generations) the two populations might then diverge in various traits because of different selection pressures in the two different locations, or simply by chance effects* which would lead to the two gene pools drifting in different ways.
Two groups that had formed separate species such that members of the two different species are no longer able to mate to produce fertile offspring, might subsequently come to encounter each other again (e.g., members of one species migrating into to the territory of the other) but inter-breeding would no longer be possible. A further mechanism to avoid breeding (by further "diverge[nce] in their traits") would not seem to make any difference.
If they actually cannot breed, there is no need to avoid breeding.
A breeding euphemism?
However, perhaps 'breeding' was being used by Dr Dunn as a euphemism (this was after all a family-friendly radio programme broadcast in the afternoon), as a polite way of saying this might avoid the moneys copulating with genetically incompatible partners – tamarins of another species. As tamarins presumably do not themselves have a formal biological species concept, they will not avoid coupling with an animal from a different species on the grounds that they cannot breed and so it would be ineffective. They indulge in sexual activity in response to instinctive drives, rather than in response to deliberate family planning decisions. That is, we might safely assume these couplings are about sexual attraction rather than a desire to have children.
I think that was what Jürgen Habermas may have meant when he wrote that:
"…the reproduction of every individual organism seems to warrant the assumption of purposiveness without purposeful activity…"
In terms of fitness, an animal is clearly more likely to have offspring if it is attracted to a sexually comparable partner than a non-compatible one. Breeding is clearly important for the survival of the species, and uses precious resources. Matings that could not lead to pregnancy (or, perhaps worse from a resource perspective, might lead to infertile hybrids that need to be nurtured but then fail to produce 'grandchildren'), would reduce breeding success overall in the populations. Assuming that a tamarin is more likely to be attracted to a member of a different species when it does not look so different from its own kind, it is those monkeys in the two groups that look most alike who are likely to be inadvertently sharing intimate moments with biologically incompatible partners.
A teleological explanation
Dr Dunn's suggestion that "quite often [the two species] become more distinct than you would expect them to, to avoid breeding with one another" sounds like teleology. That is, it seems to imply that there is a purpose (to avoid inter-breeding) and the "species actually diverge in their traits" in order to bring about this goal. This would be a teleological explanation.
I suspect the actual explanation is not that the two species "come more distinct…to avoid breeding with one another" but rather than they come more distinct because they cannot breed with each other, and so there is a selection advantage favouring the most distinct members of the two different species (if they are indeed less likely than their less distinguishable conspecifics to couple with allospecific mates).
I also suspect that Dr Dunn does not actually subscribe to the teleological argument, but is using a common way of talking that biologists often adopt as a kind of abbreviated argument: biologists know that when they refer to evolution having a purpose (e.g., to avoid cross-breeding), that is only a figure of speech.
Comprehension versus accuracy?
However, I am not sure that is always so obvious to non-specialists listening to them. Learners often find natural selection a challenging topic, and many would be quite happy with accepting that adaptations may have a purpose (rather than just a consequence). This reflects a common challenge of communicating science – either in formal teaching or supporting public understanding.
The teacher or science communicator simplifies accounts and uses everyday ways of expressing ideas that an audience without specialist knowledge can readily engage with to help 'make the unfamiliar familiar'. However, the simplifications and approximations and short-cuts we use to make sure what is said can be understood (i.e., made sense of) by non-specialists also risks us being misunderstood.
What is the relationship between Albert Einstein and St. John the Baptist?
Why would someone seeking to communicate scientific ideas to a broad readership refer to St. John?
Spoiler alert: in a direct sense, there clearly is no relationship. St. John lived in Palestine two thousand years ago, was a preacher, and is not known to have had any particular interest in what we think of as physics or science more generally. Albert Einstein was a theoretical physicist, and probably the most famous scientist of the twentieth century, perhaps of all time.
It is fair to point out both were Jewish: John can be considered a Jewish prophet. There has been much speculation on Einstein's religious thought. Of Jewish background, he was subject to the Nazi's fascist policies in Germany and fled to spent much of his life in the U.S.A. Sometimes considered an atheist, Einstein did talk of God (as not playing dice for example – that is, not leaving room in the Universe for completely random events) but it is sometimes claimed he use the idea of God as a metaphor for some kind of pantheistic or general spiritual background to the universe. In general though, he stuck to physics, and campaigned on issues like world peace.
My posing this question was motivated by reading something written by Herman Weyl (1885 – 1955) who is described by Wikipedia as "a German mathematician, theoretical physicist and philosopher". In one of his writings Weyl referred to Hendrik Lorentz who (again according to Wikipedia) was "a Dutch physicist who shared the 1902 Nobel Prize in Physics with Pieter Zeeman for the discovery and theoretical explanation of the Zeeman effect".
This is how Weyl described Lorentz:
"the Dutch physicist H.A. Lorentz who, as Einstein's John the Baptist, prepared the way for the gospel of relativity."
Weyl, 1952/2016, pp.131-132.
Those studying physics at high levels, or reading about relativity theory, will probably have heard of the 'Lorentz transformations' that are used in calculations in special relativity.
An extended metaphor?
What Weyl is doing here is using a metaphor, or perhaps an analogy. In a metaphor a writer or speaker says that something is something else – to imply it has some attribute of that other thing.
In an analogy, one system is compared with another to show that there is, or to suggest that perhaps might be, a structural similarity. Usually analogies are presented as an explicit comparison (X is like Y: i.e., rather than 'Lorentz was Einstein's John the Baptist', perhaps 'Lorentz was like Einstein's John the Baptist in the sense that…')
As Weyl does not say Lorentz was like a John the baptist figure, or played a role similar to John the Baptist, but that he was "Einstein's John the Baptist" I would consider this a metaphor. However, it is an extended metaphor as the comparison is explained as justified because Lorentz "prepared the way for the gospel of relativity".
That could be seen as a second metaphor in that relativity is normally considered a theory (or two theories, special relativity, and general relativity), and not a gospel – a word that means 'good news'. So Weyl is saying that Lorentz prepared the way for the good news of relativity!
Making the familiar unfamiliar?
When I read this comment I immediately felt I appreciated the point that Weyl was seeking to make. However, I also felt that this was a rather odd comparison to make, as I was not sure how universally it would be understood.
Those communicating about science, whether as science teachers or journalists or (as here) scientists themselves looking to reach a general audience, have the task of 'making the unfamiliar (what people do not yet know about, and may indeed seem odd) familiar'. There are various techniques that can be used, and often these involve some form of comparison of what is being told about with something that is in some ways similar, and which is already familiar to the audience.
I attended 'Sunday school' from a young age (I think before starting day school if I recall correctly) at a London City Mission church, and later at a Methodist Church, where I became a Sunday school teacher before i went off to University. I therefore learnt quite a bit about Christianity. Anyone with such a background will have learnt that John the Baptist was a cousin of Jesus Christ, who preached 'the coming of the Lord' (i.e., the Jewish messiah, identified in Christianity with Jesus), and baptised Jesus in the River Jordan as he set out on his mission as a preacher and healer. John is said to have told his congregation to "prepare ye, the way of the Lord!" (the title of a song in the musical 'Godspell').
Someone knowing about Christianity in this way (regardless of whether they accept Christian teaching, or even the historical accuracy of the Baptism story) would likely immediately appreciate that just as John prepared the way for Jesus' ministry in first Century (CE) Palestine, so, according to Weyl, Lorentz prepared physics, laid important groundwork, for Einstein's work on relativity.
When you have the necessary background, such comparisons work effectively and quickly – the idea is communicated without the reader having to puzzle over and interpret the expressions "Einstein's John the Baptist" and "gospel of relativity" or deliberate on what is meant by 'preparing the way'. That is, the if the reader has the relevant 'interpretive resources' then understanding is an automatic process that does not require any conscious effort.
Culture-specific interpretive resources?
But I wondered what someone would make of this phrase ('Einstein's John the Baptist') if they did not have knowledge of the Bible stories? After all, in many parts of the world most people are not Christians, and may have little or no knowledge of Christian traditions. Did Weyl just assume everyone would have the background to appreciate his comparison, or did he assume he was only writing for an audience in certain parts of the world where this was common knowledge?
Certainly, as teachers, our attempts to help our students understand abstract ideas by making references to common cultural phenomena can fall flat if the learners are not familiar with those phenomena. It is counter-productive if the teacher has to interrupt their presentation on some abstract idea to explain the very comparison that was meant to help explain the scientific concept or principle. If you have no idea who 'John the Baptist' was, in what sense he 'prepared the way' for Jesus, or or how the term 'Gospel' came to be attached to the accounts of Jesus' life, then it is not so easy to appreciate what Lorentz was to Einstein's work from Weyl's prose. We can only make the unfamiliar familiar by using cultural references when we share those references with those we are communicating with.
Work cited:
Weyl, H. (1952/2016). Symmetry (New Princeton Science Library edition ed.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
"If the muscles and other cells of the body burn sugar instead of oxygen…"
Do they think we cannot handle the scientific truth?
I should really have gone to bed, but I was just surfing the channels in case there was some 'must watch' programme I might miss, and I came across a screening of the film 'A few good men'. This had been a very popular movie at one time, and I seem to recall watching it with my late wife. I remembered it as an engaging film, and as an example of the 'courtroom drama' genre: but beyond that I could really only remember Tom Cruise as defence advocate questioning Jack Nicholson's as a commanding officer – and the famous line from Nicholson – "You can't handle the truth!".
This became something of a meme – I suspect now there are a lot of people who 'know' and use that line, who have never even seen the film and may not know what they are quoting from.
So, I though I might watch a bit, to remind myself what the actual case was about. In brief, a marine stationed at the U.S. Guantánamo Bay naval base and detention camp had died at the hands of two of his comrades. They had not intended to kill, but admitted mistreating him – their defence was they were simply obeying orders in subjecting a colleague who was not measuring up, and was letting the unit down, to some unpleasant, but ultimately (supposedly) harmless, punishment.
The film does not contain a lot of science, but what struck me was the failure to get some science that was invoked right. I was so surprised at what I thought I'd heard being presented as science, that I went back and replayed a section, and I then decided to see if I could find the script (by Aaron Sorkin*, screenplay adapted from his own theatre play) on the web, to see if what was said had actually been written into the script.
One of the witnesses is a doctor who is asked by the prosecuting counsel to explain lactic acidosis.
Burning sugar instead of oxygen?
The characters here are:
Capt. Jack Ross (played by Kevin Bacon) the prosecuting counsel,
Dr. Stone (Christopher Guest) and
Lt. Daniel Kaffee (Cruise's character).
On direct examination:
Ross: Dr. Stone, what's lactic acidosis?
Stone: If the muscles and other cells of the body burn sugar instead of oxygen, lactic acid is produced. That lactic acid is what caused Santiago's lungs to bleed.
Ross: How long does it take for the muscles and other cells to begin burning sugar instead of oxygen?
Stone: Twenty to thirty minutes.
Ross: And what caused Santiago's muscles and other cells to start burning sugar? [In the film, the line seems to be: And what caused this process to be speed up in Santiago's muscles?]
Stone: An ingested poison of some kind.
Later, under cross-examination
Kafee: Commander, if I had a coronary condition, and a perfectly clean rag was placed in my mouth, and the rag was accidentally pushed too far down, is it possible that my cells would continue burning sugar after the rag was taken out?
Stone: It would have to be a very serious condition.
What?
If a student suggested that lactic acid is produced when the muscles burn sugar instead of oxygen we would likely consider this an alternative conception (misconception). It is, at best, a clumsy phrasing, and is simply wrong.
Respiration
Metabolism is a set of processes under very fine controls, so whether we should refer to metabolism as burning or not, is a moot point. Combustion tends to be a vigorous process that is usually uncontrolled. But we can see it as a metaphor: carbohydrates are 'burnt' up in the sense that they undergo reactions analogous to burning.
But burning requires oxygen (well, in the lab. we might burn materials in chlorine, but, in general, and in everyday life, combustion is a reaction with oxygen), so what could burning oxygen mean?
In respiration, glucose is in effect reacted with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide and water. However, this is not a single step process, but a complex set of smaller reactions – the overall effect of which is
glucose + oxygen → carbon dioxide + water
Breaking glucose down to lactic acid also acts as an energy source, but is no where near as effective. Our muscles can undertake this ('anaerobic') process when there is insufficient oxygen supply – for example when undertaking high stamina exercise – but this is best seen as a temporary stop-gap, as lactic acid build up causes problems (cramp for example) – even if not usually death.
Does science matter?
Now clearly the science is not central to the story of 'A few good men'. The main issues are (factual)
whether the accused men were acting under orders;
(ethical)
the nature of illegal orders,
when service personal should question and ignore orders (deontology) given that they seldom have the whole picture (and in this film one of the accused men is presented as something of a simpleton who viewer may suspect should not be given much responsibility for decision making),
whether it is acceptable to use corporal or cruel punishment on an under-performing soldier (or marine) given that the lives of many may depend upon their high levels of performance (consequentialism, or perhaps pragmatics)…
There is also a medical issue, regarding whether the torture of the soldier was the primary cause of death, or whether there was an underlying health issue which the medical officer (Stone) had missed and which might also explain the poor performance. [That is a theme which featured large in a recent very high profile real murder case.]
Otherwise the film is about the characters of, and relationships among, the legal officers. Like most good films – this is film about people, and being human in the world, and how we behave towards and relate to each other.
The nature of lactic acidosis is hardly a key point.
But if it is worth including in the script as the assumed cause of death, and its nature relevant – why not get the science right?
Perhaps, because science is complicated and needs to be simplified for the cinema-goer who, after all, wants to be entertained, not lectured?
Perhaps there is no simple account of lactic acidosis which could be included in the script without getting technical, and entering into a long and complicated explanation.
In teaching science…
But surely that is not true. In teaching we often have to employ simplifications which ignore complexity and nuance for the benefit of getting the core idea across to learners. We seek the optimal level of simplification that learners can make good sense of, but which is true to the core essence of the actual science being discussed (it is 'intellectually honest') and provides a suitable basis for later more advanced treatments.
It can be hard to find that optimum level of simplification – but I really do not think that explaining lactic acidosis as burning sugar instead of oxygen could be considered a credit-worthy attempt.
Dr. Stone, can we try again?
What about, something like:
Dr. Stone, what's lactic acidosis?
It occurs when the body tissues do not have sufficient oxygen to fully break down sugar in the usual way, and damaging lactic aid is produced instead of carbon dioxide and water.
I am sure there are lots of possible tweaks here. The point is that the script did not need to go into a long medical lecture, but by including something that was simply nonsensical, and should be obviously wrong to anyone who had studied respiration at school (which should be everyone who has been to school in the past few decades in many countries), it distracts, and so detracts, from the story.
All images from 'A few good men' (1992, Columbia Pictures)
* I see that ("acclaimed screenwriter") Aaron Sorkin is planning a new live television version of 'A Few Good Men' – so perhaps the description of lactic acidosis can be updated?
BBC corrects cruel (to cats) scientific claim on its website
Keith S. Taber
I just got 80% on a science test for primary school children
I've just scored 4/5 (80%) on an on-line KS2 science test on the BBC (the British Broadcasting Corporation) educational website. 80% sounds quite good out of context, but I am a science teacher and KS2 is meant for 7-11 year olds.
The BBC awards me 4/5 for my primary level science knowledge about the states of matter
My defence is that the question I got wrong was ambiguous (but, as Christine Keeler might have said, I would say that).
I was actually getting round to checking on something from a while back.
In 2019 I came across something on the website that I thought was very misleading – and I complained to the BBC through their website form. I had an immediate, but generic response:
"Thank you for taking the time to send us your comments. We appreciate all the feedback we receive as it plays an important role in helping to shape our decisions.
This is an automated message (sorry that we can't reply individually) to let you know that we've read your comments and will report them overnight to staff across the BBC for them to read too (after removing any personal details). This includes our programme makers, commissioning editors and senior management.
Thanks again for contacting the BBC.
BBC Audience Services.
NB: Please do not reply to this email. It includes a reference number but comes from an automated account which is not monitored."
Email: 6th Sept., 2019
This kind of response is somewhat frustating. My complaint had been recieved, and would be passed on, but it looked like I would get no specific response (as presumably if my "comments" were to be reported to relevant staff "after removing any personal details", those staff would not be in a position to let me know if they were following up, dismissing, or simply ignoring, my comments.) Indeed, I never did get any follow up.
So, my intention was to check back after a decent period had elapsed (n.b., where does all the time go?) and see if anything had been changed in response to my complaint. Strictly, if there had been a change this could be because:
a) I complained
b) someone else/some other people complained (i.e., people who's complaints were taken more seriously than mine)
c) I was one of number of people who complained
d) material had been updated compleltely independently of any compaints
That is, I could not know if I personally had had any effect, BUT if the offending material (because as a chemist I was offended professionally, even if not personally) was still there then I would know my compaint had not been heeded.
So, I intended to check back; I expected to find no change (as pointing out blatant, basic, errors in the science in the English National Curriculum to government ministers did not have any effect, so the BBC…? ); and, if so, I thought of following up with an email or an old fashioned snail-mail … ("…yours, disgusted of Cambourne"*).
Well done, BBC
So, I am happy to publicly acknowledge that the BBC has changed its materials appearing under the heading 'What are the states of matter?'
The topic comprises of a short animation (with odd anthropomorphised {"guys"} geometric shapes handling examples of the states of matter: solid, liquid and gas); a series of bullet points on each state; a sorting task; and then the set of five objective (multiple choice) questions.
There are a number of issues with the examples used here, as discussed below. But the main focus of my complaint, a cartoon cat, has now been released from the indignity of being classified as a state of matter. Yes, a cat!
Limitations of the three states of matter model
The idea that matter can exist in three states is a pretty important foundation for a good deal of other science.
However there is big problem with the generality of the model. Basically it really applies to pure samples of substances: generally substances (not materials in general, and certainly not objects) exist as solids, liquids, or gases, depending on the conditions of temperature and pressure – although at high enough temperatures plasmas are formed (and theoretically when hot enough even the atomic cores, and eventually nuclei would break down – but those conditions are pretty extreme and not found in the typical home or classroom).
Examples of substances include water, salt, calcium carbonate, iron, mercury, hydrogen, graphite, carbon dioxide, sulphur… that is, elements and compounds. Of course, many of these are seldom met in pure form in everyday life outside school science labs.
Most materials that people come across are mixtures or composites. Mixtures often exist as solutions or suspensions – as gels or foams or emulsions – not as solids, liquids or gases.
This is probably why the terms 'solids', 'liquids' and 'gases' actually have two sets of meanings – the science or technical sense, and the everyday or 'life-world' sense. So milk is a liquid(everyday) as you can pour some into your tea cup and a block of wood is a solid(everyday) as it retains its shape and integrity as you nail it to another structure. But milk and wood are not substances – and so not liquid(scientific) or solid(scientific).
Does this matter? Yes, because if we are teaching children things in science lessons, it would be good to get the science right. A solid will melt at a distinct melting temperature to give a liquid which will boil at a distinct boiling temperature. Wood, for example, does not.
Wood is a complex material. It has gas pockets. It has (variable) moisture content, and the structure contains various compounds – lignin, cellulose, and many more. The response to heating reflects that complex constitution.
The BBC's examples of solids, liquids, and gases
The BBC website suggests examples of the three states of matter to introduce primary age students to the concept.
Animation:
Solids: block of ice, football
Lquids: water, honey
Gases: none are specified – animation shows the clouds (of liquid water droplets) forming around a kettle spout, and 'gas' put into in fizzy drinks is referenced.
A football is not solid, but usually air (a mixture of gases with some other components) contained in a plastic shell. (The voiceover refers simply to a 'ball', but the animation show a large ball with a traditional football pattern being used to do 'keepy uppies' by the cartoon character.)
Honey is not a liquid(scientific) but a complex mixture of sugars in solution. There is usually much more sugar than water. (So, arguably, it is more solid than liquid – but it is better to simply not consider it as either.) This is where I dropped a mark on the terminal test:
Two of the options are NOT liquids. Only one response gets credit in this test!
Web text:
The bullet points on the site list some further examples:
"Examples of solids include ice, wood and sand." (Ice and sand are solids(scientific).)
"Examples of liquids include water, honey and milk." (Only water is liquid(scientific) here.)
"Examples of gases include steam, helium and oxygen." (3/3, well done BBC!)
Sorting task:
The BBC website task invites children to sort cards showing objects into three categories. (What is that object on the front card meant to be?)
In the sorting task, children are asked to sort a number of examples shown on cards into solid, liquid, and gas:
The examples presented are air, a feather, helium, milk, a pencil, sea, steam, syrup, wood. Of these only helium and steam strictly meet the criteria for being a solid(scientific)/liquid(scientific)/gas(scientific). Yet, as suggested above, it is difficult to find genuine examples that are both scientifically correct and familiar to young children. Perhaps sea and air (at least materials) are closer approximations than a pencil or a feather ("solids retain their shape" – would a child using the website have handled a feather, and, if so, would it have retained its shape under child-handling?)
So, I still have reservations about this material, whilst acknowledging the need to balance scientific correctness with relevant (to children) examples. Strictly, some of the examples can be seen as encouraging children to get the science wrong. These things matter if only because children are learning things on this site that later in their school career will be judged as alternative conceptions and marked as wrong.
None the less, I am pleased that the BBC has at least decided to amend its sorting task, and remove the poor cat:
Which pile does the cat belong in? [This example has now been removed. Bravo.]
The website had previously been quite clear that putting the cat as anything other than solid was 'wrong'. It is classed as a solid even though a cat (like any animal) is (or would be if separated out into its constituent substances – and children should not try this at home) more water than anything else.
I had real trouble seeing how that example fitted with the criteria specified on the webpage:
"[Cats] stay in one place and can be held.
[Cats] keep their shape. They do not flow like liquids.
[Cats] always take up the same amount of space. They do not spread out like gases.
[Cats] can be cut or shaped."
Characteristics of solids, but perhaps not entirely true of cats?
* cf. the idiom 'disgusted of Tunbridge Wells' – referring to a hypothetical person who writes to media complaining about matters of concern.
Images used here are screenshots, copyright of the BBC – a publicly funded public service broadcaster.
All images from '
